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Abstract
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowl-
edge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations. First, we show
that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does
not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has se-
quential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any extensive form
mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non-Maskin monotonic social objective can be imple-
mented with this mechanism, then there are arbitrarily small information perturbations under
which an undesirable sequential equilibrium also exists. Finally, we argue that outside options
can help improve e¢ ciency in asymmetric information environments, and that these options can
be thought of as re￿ ecting ownership of an asset.
￿This paper builds on two preliminary contributions, respectively by Aghion, Fudenberg and Holden (2009) and
Kunimoto and Tercieux (2009).
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11 Introduction
The literature on ￿complete-information￿ implementation supposes that players know the payo⁄-
relevant state of the world, and asks which mappings from states to outcomes, i.e., which social
choice rules, can be implemented by mechanisms that respect the players￿incentives. Although
only Maskin monotonic social rules are ￿Nash implementable￿ (Maskin, 1999), a larger class of
social choice rules can be implemented in extensive form games provided that a more restrictive
equilibrium notion is used.1
This paper considers the robustness of subgame-perfect implementation to arbitrarily small
amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature ￿, which we refer to as ￿information
perturbations￿ .2 It is known that re￿nements of Nash equilibrium are not robust to general small
perturbations of the payo⁄ structure (Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988), henceforth FKL), but
our results do not follow from theirs as we consider a more restrictive class of perturbations: We
￿x the map from states to payo⁄s and perturb the prior distribution over the states of the world
and signal structure, so in particular the messages in the mechanism remain cheap talk and do not
enter directly into the payo⁄ functions.
Our starting point is the Moore and Repullo (1988, henceforth, MR) result which roughly says
that for any social choice rule, one can design a mechanism that yields unique implementation in
subgame-perfect equilibria (i.e., for all states of nature, the set of all subgame-perfect equilibria of
the induced game yields the desired outcome). In particular, in environments with money, Moore
and Repullo propose a simple mechanism (which we call an MR mechanism) inducing truth-telling
as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. As in MR, our focus is on exact implementation, where
￿exact implementation￿means that we require the set of equilibrium outcomes to exactly coincide
with those picked by the rule.3
The requirement of exact implementation can be decomposed into the following two parts: (1)
there always exists an equilibrium whose outcome coincides with the given rule; (2) there are no
equilibria whose outcomes di⁄er from those of the rule.
Our ￿rst result shows that MR mechanisms can only robustly satisfy the ￿rst requirement of
exact implementation if the rule that is implemented is Maskin monotonic. That is, whenever an
1Recall that a social choice rule or function f is Maskin monotonic if for any pair of states ￿ and ￿
0 such that
a = f(￿); and a never goes down in the preference ranking of any agent when moving from state ￿ to state ￿
0, then
necessarily a = f(￿
0).
2It follows from Theorem 14.5 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a, p.567) that under our small informational pertur-
bations, for each pro￿le of signals that has strictly positive probability under complete information, some state of
nature is common p-belief (Monderer and Samet (1989)) with p arbitrarily close to one. That is, everybody believes
this is the true state with probability at least p, everybody believes with probability at least p that everybody believes
this is the true state with probability at least p etc...
3Much of the implementation literature studies exact implementation. Virtual implementation (Matsushima
(1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991)) uses non-deterministic mechanisms, and only requires that social choice rules
be implemented with high probability. As pointed out by Jackson (2001), unlike exact implementation, virtual
implementation is not robust to introducing a small amount of nonlinearity in preferences over lotteries. In addition,
virtual implementation provides incentives for renegotiation on the equilibrium path: As Abreu and Matsuhima (1992)
acknowledge, virtual implementation supposes that the social planner can commit ex ante to outcomes that will be
known at the time of implementation to be highly ine¢ cient.
2MR mechanism implements a non-Maskin monotonic social choice rule, the truth-telling equilibrium
ceases to be an equilibrium in some nearby environment. More speci￿cally, we show that an
MR mechanism which implements a social choice rule f under common knowledge (or complete
information4) about the state of nature does not yield even approximately truthful revelation under
arbitrarily small information perturbations, if this f is not Maskin monotonic.5
We then move beyond MR mechanisms to consider any extensive-form mechanism. Our second
result is concerned with the non-robustness of the second requirement of exact implementation:
namely, whenever any mechanism implements a non-Maskin monotonic social choice rule, there
exists an undesirable equilibrium in some nearby environment. More speci￿cally, restricting atten-
tion to environments with a ￿nite state space, and to mechanisms with ￿nite strategy spaces,6 then
given any mechanism that ￿subgame-perfect ￿ implements a non-Maskin monotonic social choice
rule f under common knowledge (i.e., whose subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in any state ￿
is precisely equal to f(￿)), we can ￿nd a sequence of information perturbations (i.e., of deviations
from complete information about the state of nature) and a corresponding sequence of sequential
equilibria for the mechanism under the corresponding information perturbations, whose outcomes
do not converge to f(￿) for at least one state ￿. In other words, there always exist arbitrarily small
information perturbations under which an ￿undesirable￿sequential7 (and hence Perfect Bayesian)
equilibrium exists.
Three insights underlie our analysis. The ￿rst is that even a small amount of uncertainty about
the state at the interim stage, when players have observed their signals but not yet played the
game, can loom large ex post once the extensive form game has started and players can partly
reveal their private signals through their strategy choice at each node of the game. The second
insight is that arbitrarily small information perturbations can turn the outcome of a non-sequential
Nash equilibrium of the game with common knowledge of ￿ into the outcome of a sequential
equilibrium of the perturbed game. In particular, we know that any extensive-form mechanism
that ￿subgame-perfect￿ implements a non-Maskin monotonic social choice rule under common
knowledge has at least one Nash equilibrium which is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium; we prove
that this undesirable Nash equilibrium can be turned into an undesirable sequential equilibrium
by only introducing small information perturbations. The third insight is that there is a role for
asset ownership to mitigate the investment and trade ine¢ ciencies that arise when the contracting
parties have private information ex post about the state of nature ￿.
Our results are not a straightforward application of those on the robustness of re￿nements of
Nash equilibrium because we consider a smaller class of perturbations. While FKL consider several
nested classes of perturbations, even the most restrictive form they analyze allows a player￿ s payo⁄
in the perturbed game to vary with the realized actions in an arbitrary way. In the mechanism
4Throughout the paper, we use ￿complete information￿and ￿common knowledge￿interchangeably.
5As we shall stress in Section 2.5 below, Maskin monotonicity is precisely the property that the social choice rules
usually considered in contract theory do not satisfy.
6The Appendix extends the result to the case of countable message spaces.
7We remind the reader of the formal de￿nition in Section 4.2.1.
3design setting, this implies that some (low-probability) ￿crazy types￿ might have a systematic
preference for truthtelling. Since the messages and outcome functions of the mechanism are not
primitives, but rather endogenous objects to be chosen by the social planner, it may seem natural
to restrict the perturbations to be independent of the messages and depend only on the allocation
that is implemented.
Our paper contributes most directly to the mechanism design literature, starting with Maskin￿ s
(1999) Nash implementation result and Moore-Repullo￿ s (1988) subgame-perfect implementation
analysis, by showing the non-robustness of subgame-perfect implementation to information per-
turbations.8 Our paper is also related to Chung and Ely￿ s (2003) study of the robustness of un-
dominated Nash implementation. Chung and Ely show that if a social choice rule is not Maskin
monotonic but can be implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium 9 under complete information,
then there are information perturbations under which an undesirable undominated Nash equilib-
rium appears. In contrast, we consider extensive-form mechanisms and show that only Maskin
monotonic social choice rules can be implemented in the closure of the sequential equilibrium cor-
respondence. In general, the existence of a bad sequential equilibrium in the perturbed game
neither implies nor is implied by the existence of a bad undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
as undominated Nash equilibria need not be sequential equilibria, and sequential equilibria can use
dominated strategies.10 Hence, although our paper has a similar spirit to Chung and Ely (2003),
our argument is quite distinct from theirs.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the hold-up problem. Grossman and Hart (1986)
argue that in contracting situations where states of nature are observable but not veri￿able, asset
ownership (or vertical integration) could help limit the extent to which one party can be held up
by the other party, which in turn should encourage ex ante investment by the former. However,
vertical integration as a solution to the hold-up problem has been questioned in papers which
use or extend the subgame-perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988).11 In
particular, Maskin and Tirole (1999a), henceforth MT, show that the non-veri￿ability of states of
nature can be overcome by using a 3-stage subgame-perfect implementation mechanism that induces
truth-telling by all parties as the unique equilibrium outcome, and does so in pure strategies. We
contribute to this debate in two ways. First we show that the introduction of even small information
perturbations greatly reduces the power of subgame-perfect implementation. This suggests that
the introduction of incomplete information can signi￿cantly change the insights obtained by MT.
8Other related mechanism design papers include Cremer and McLean (1988), Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser
(1990), and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1991). These papers show how one can take advantage of the correlation
between agents￿signals in designing incentives to approximate the Nash equilibrium under complete information.
These papers consider static implementation games with commitment, and look at fairly general information struc-
tures, as opposed to our focus on the robustness of subgame-perfect implementation to small perturbations from
complete information.
9An undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium where no player ever uses a weakly dominated action.
10Trembling-hand perfect equilibria cannot use dominated strategies, and sequential and trembling-hand perfect
equilibria coincide for generic assignments of payo⁄s to terminal nodes (Kreps and Wilson [1982]), but the generic
payo⁄s restriction rules out our assumption that messages are cheap talk.
11For example, see Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey (1994) and Maskin-Tirole (1999a, 1999b).
4Secondly, we show that when there is asymmetric information ex post about the good￿ s valuation,
an outside option for the seller permits a more e¢ cient outcome. We argue that this option can be
seen as corresponding to ownership of an asset.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a simple buyer-seller example to introduce
the MR mechanism, to show why truthful implementation using this mechanism is not robust to
small information perturbations, and why such perturbations generate an undesirable sequential
equilibrium. Section 3 extends our analysis to general MR mechanisms with n states of nature
and transferable utility, and shows that for a given social choice rule f, truth-telling equilibria are
only robust to small information perturbations if this f is strategy-proof (which in turn implies
Maskin monotonicity under weak assumptions on preferences).12 In Section 4, we ask whether any
extensive form mechanism is robust to small information perturbations. There we prove that for
any social choice rule that is not Maskin-monotonic one can ￿nd small information perturbations
under which an undesirable sequential equilibrium exists. Section 5 considers the case of full
informational asymmetry ex post, and shows that asset ownership, by providing outside options,
can lead to approximately e¢ cient ex ante investments, whereas contracts or mechanisms with no
outside option, cannot. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a few remarks and also suggestions for
future research.
2 A Hart-Moore example of the Moore-Repullo mechanism
2.1 Basic setup
Consider the following simple example from Hart and Moore (2003), which captures the logic of
Moore and Repullo (1988)￿ s subgame-perfect implementation mechanism.
There are two parties, a B(uyer) and a S(eller) of a single unit of an indivisible good. If trade
occurs then B￿ s payo⁄ is
VB = ￿ ￿ p;
where p is the price and ￿ is the good￿ s quality. S￿ s payo⁄ is
VS = p;
thus we normalize the cost of producing the good to zero.
The good can be of either high or low quality. If it is high quality then B values it at ￿H = 14;
and if it is low quality then B values it at ￿L = 10: We seek to implement the social choice function
whereby the good is always traded ex post, and where the buyer always pays the true ￿ to the
seller.
12If f is strategy-proof, it is always a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to tell the truth in the direct
mechanism associated with f. See also De￿nition 1 for a precise de￿nition of strategy-proofness.
52.2 Common knowledge
Suppose ￿rst that the quality ￿ is observable and common knowledge to both parties. Even though
￿ is not veri￿able by a court, so no initial contract between the two parties can be made credibly
contingent upon ￿, truthful revelation of ￿ by the buyer B and the implementation of the above
social choice function can be achieved through the following Moore-Repullo (MR) mechanism:
1. B announces either a ￿high￿ or ￿low￿ quality. If B announces ￿high￿ then B pays S a price
equal to 14 and the game stops.
2. If B announces ￿low￿ and S does not ￿challenge￿ B￿ s announcement, then B pays a price equal
to 10 and the game stops.
3. If S challenges B￿ s announcement then:
(a) B pays a ￿ne F = 9 to T (a third party)
(b) B is o⁄ered the good for 6
(c) If B accepts the good then S receives F from T (and also a payment of 6 from B) and
the game stops.
(d) If B rejects at 3b then S pays F to T
(e) B and S each get the item with probability 1/2.
When the true value of the good is common knowledge between B and S, this mechanism yields
truth-telling as the unique subgame-perfect (and also sequential) equilibrium. To see this, consider
￿rst the case ￿ = ￿H. If B announces ￿high￿ then B pays 14 and we stop. If, however, B announces
￿low￿ then S will challenge because at stage 3a, B pays 9 to T and, this cost being sunk, B will
still accept the good for price of 6 at stage 3b (since by rejecting he will end up at stage 3e and get
14/2=7, but since the good is worth 14 he gets 14-6=8 by accepting). Anticipating this, S knows
that if she challenges B, she will receive 9+6 = 15, which is greater than 10 that she would receive
if she did not challenge. Moving back to stage 1, if B lies and announces ￿low￿ when the true state
is high, he gets 14￿9￿6 = ￿1; whereas he gets 14￿14 = 0 if he tells the truth, so truthtelling is
the unique equilibrium here. Truthtelling is also the unique equilibrium when ￿ = ￿L : In that case
S will not challenge B when B (truthfully) announces ￿low￿ , because now B will refuse the good
at price 6 (accepting the good at 6 would yield surplus 10 ￿ 6 = 4 to B whereas by refusing the
good and relying on the lottery which assigns the item randomly instead B can secure a surplus
equal to 10=2 = 5). Anticipating this, S will not challenge B because doing so would give her a net
surplus equal to 10=2 ￿ 9 = ￿4 which is less than the payment of 10 she receives if she does not
challenge B￿ s announcement.
This mechanism (and more generally, the Moore-Repullo mechanisms we describe in Section 3)
has two nice and important properties. First, it yields unique implementation in subgame-perfect
equilibrium, i.e., for any state of nature, there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium which yields
6the right outcome. Second, in each state, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is appealing from
a behavioral point of view since it involves telling the truth. In what follows, we will show that
both of these properties fail once we introduce small information perturbations.
2.3 The failure of truth-telling with perturbed beliefs about value
2.3.1 Pure strategy equilibria
As in the example above, we continue to suppose that the good has possible values ￿ 2 f￿H;￿Lg
with ￿H = 14 (the high state) and ￿L = 10 (the low state). However, we now suppose that the
players have imperfect information about ￿: Speci￿cally, we suppose they have a common prior ￿,
with ￿(￿H) = 1 ￿ ￿; ￿(￿L) = ￿ for some ￿ 2 (0;1); and that each player receives a draw from a
signal structure with two possible signals sh or s‘, where sh is a high signal that is associated with
￿H, and s‘ is a low signal associated with ￿L. We use the notation sB = sh
B (resp. sB = s‘
B) to
refer to the event in which B receives the high signal sh (resp. the low signal s‘) and similarly we
use the notation sS = sh
S (resp. sS = s‘
S) to refer to the event in which S receives the high signal
sh (resp. the low signal s‘): The following table shows the joint probability distribution ￿" over ￿;
the buyer￿ s signal sB, and the seller￿ s signal sS:
(￿)
￿" sh
B;sh
S sh
B;s‘
S s‘
B;sh
S s‘
B;s‘
S
￿H (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ " ￿ "2￿
(1 ￿ ￿)" (1 ￿ ￿)"2=2 (1 ￿ ￿)"2=2
￿L ￿"2=2 ￿"2=2 ￿" ￿
￿
1 ￿ " ￿ "2￿
Note that for all ", the marginal probability distribution of ￿" on ￿ coincides with ￿;and that
as " converges to zero, ￿" assigns probability converging to 1 to the signals being correct. Note
also that the buyer￿ s signal becomes in￿nitely more accurate than the seller￿ s signal as " ! 0: This
special feature implies that when deciding whether or not to challenge the buyer if S and B were
informed of both signals, and the signals disagree, they will conclude that with high probability
the state corresponds to B￿ s signal.
We will now show that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in which the buyer always
reports truthfully. To simplify the exposition of this example, we keep the payments under the
perturbed mechanism the same as in the MR mechanism under common knowledge of the previous
subsection, and assume that B must participate in the mechanism. This is equivalent to assuming
that B￿ s participation constraint is slack, which in turn can be arranged by a constant ex ante
payment and so does not in￿ uence the incentives for truthtelling. By way of contradiction, suppose
there is a pure strategy equilibrium in which B reports truthfully, and consider B￿ s play when sB =
sh
B: Then B believes that, regardless of what signal player S gets, the expected value of the good
is greater than 10: So B would like to announce ￿low￿ if he expects that S will not challenge the
announcement. If B does announces ￿low,￿ then in a fully revealing equilibrium, S will infer that
B must have received the low signal, i.e., sB = s‘
B: But under signal structure (￿), S thinks that
B￿ s signal is much more likely to be correct, so S now believes that there is a large probability that
￿ = ￿L; therefore S will not challenge.
7But then, at stage 1, anticipating that S will not challenge, B will prefer to announce ￿low￿ when
he receives the high signal sh
B: Therefore, there does not exist a fully revealing equilibrium in pure
strategies and consequently, the above social choice function can no longer be implemented through
the above MR mechanism in pure strategies.
2.3.2 Allowing for mixed strategies
The result that there are no truthful equilibria in pure strategies leaves open the possibility that
there are mixed strategy equilibria in which the probability of truthful announcement goes to one
as " goes to zero. This is close to the way that the pure-strategy Stackelberg equilibrium can be
approximated by a mixed equilibrium of a ￿noisy commitment game￿ (van Damme and Hurkens
(1997)). We show below that this is not the case under the signal structure (￿).
Let ￿h
B denote the probability that B announces ￿low￿after receiving the high signal sh
B; and
let ￿‘
B be the probability B announces ￿high￿after receiving the low signal s‘
B , as in the following
table:
High Low
sh
B 1 ￿ ￿h
B ￿h
B
s‘
B ￿‘
B 1 ￿ ￿‘
B
The corresponding mixing probabilities for player S are
Challenge Don￿ t Challenge
sh
S 1 ￿ ￿h
S ￿h
S
s‘
S ￿‘
S 1 ￿ ￿‘
S
Then for mixed strategy equilibria of the mechanism to converge to the equilibrium under com-
plete information where the buyer announces the valuation truthfully, we should have ￿
";h
B ;￿
";‘
B ;￿
";h
S
and ￿
";‘
S all converge to 0 as " ! 0: However, this is not the case, as shown by the following:
Proposition 1. Under the information perturbations corresponding to (￿), there is no sequence of
equilibrium strategies ￿"
B;￿"
S such that ￿
";h
B ;￿
";‘
B ;￿
";h
S and ￿
";‘
S all converge to 0 as " ! 0:
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose to the contrary that there is a sequence of equilibrium strategies
￿"
B;￿"
S such that ￿
";h
B ;￿
";‘
B ;￿
";h
S and ￿
";‘
S all converge to 0 as " ! 0. In Stage 1, the expected payo⁄of
player B who received the low signal s‘
B and plays ￿High (H)￿tends to ￿4 while the expected payo⁄
of player B who received the low signal s‘
B and plays ￿Low (L)￿ tends to 0 (here, player B makes
use of the signal distribution (￿) together with the expectation that the seller￿ s strategies ￿
";h
S and
￿
";‘
S converge to 0 as " ! 0, B believes with high probability that S does not ￿Challenge￿ ). Now, in
Stage 1, the expected payo⁄of player B who received the high signal sh
B and plays ￿High (H)￿ tends
to 0 while the expected payo⁄ of player B who received the high signal sh
B and plays ￿Low (L)￿ in
the limit is below maxf14￿6￿9;7￿9g = ￿1 (recall that B believes with high probability that S
chooses ￿Challenge￿ ). So for " small, there is no ￿ that makes player B indi⁄erent between H and
8L; so player B plays in pure strategies in Stage 1. And as in argument above about pure-strategy
equilibrium, the fact that B￿ s signal is much more accurate than S￿ s implies that such a strategy
pro￿le is not an equilibrium.
This shows that one appealing property of the unique equilibrium in the MR mechanism under
common knowledge (namely, a good equilibrium is a truthful one) can disappear once we introduce
small information perturbations. In the next subsection we show the non-robustness of another
appealing property of the MR mechanism under common knowledge, namely that it uniquely
implements any desired social choice function.
2.4 Existence of persistently bad sequential equilibria
So far we have shown that truth-telling is not a robust equilibrium outcome of the MR mech-
anism when allowing for information perturbations. But in fact one can go further and exhibit
arbitrarily small information perturbations for which the above MR mechanism also has a ￿bad
equilibrium￿ where the buyer reports ￿Low￿regardless of his signal, which in turn leads to a sequen-
tial equilibrium outcome which remains bounded away from the sequential (or subgame-perfect)
equilibrium outcome under complete information.
Consider the same MR mechanism as before, with the same common prior ￿(￿H) = 1 ￿ ￿ and
￿(￿L) = ￿, but with the following perturbation ￿" of signals about ￿:
(￿￿)
￿" sh
B;sh
S sh
B;s‘
S s‘
B;sh
S s‘
B;s‘
S
￿H (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ "2) (1 ￿ ￿)"2=3 (1 ￿ ￿)"2=3 (1 ￿ ￿)"2=3
￿L ￿"2 ￿"=2 ￿"=2 ￿(1 ￿ " ￿ "2)
With this signal structure, both agents believe with high probability that if they receive di⁄erent
signals, the signal corresponding to the low state is correct.
In what follows, we shall construct a sequential equilibrium of the perturbed game with prior
￿" whose outcome di⁄ers substantially from that with complete information.
Consider the following strategy pro￿le of the game with prior ￿". B announces ￿Low￿ regardless
of his signal. If B has announced ￿Low,￿ S does not challenge regardless of her signal. O⁄ the
equilibrium path, i.e., if B announced ￿Low￿ and S subsequently challenged, then B always rejects
S￿ s o⁄er. These are our candidate strategies for sequential equilibrium. To complete the description
of the candidate for sequential equilibrium, we also have to assign beliefs over states and signals
for each signal of each player and any history of play. Before playing the game but after receiving
their private signals, agents￿beliefs are given by ￿" conditioned on their private signals. Similarly,
if S has the opportunity to move (which in turn requires that B would have played ￿Low￿ ), we
assume that her posterior beliefs are based on ￿" together with her private signal. Finally, out of
equilibrium, if B is o⁄ered the good for price of 6 (which requires that S will have challenged), we
assume that B always believes with probability one that the state is ￿L and that S has received
the low signal s‘
S.
9So what we want to show is that for " > 0 su¢ ciently small, the above strategy pro￿le is
sequentially rational given the beliefs we just described and that, conversely, these beliefs are
consistent given the above strategy pro￿le. Here we shall check sequential rationality (the basic
intuition for the belief consistency part of the proof is given in footnote 13 below). To establish
sequential rationality, we solve the game backwards. At Stage 3, regardless of his signal, B believes
with probability one that the state is ￿L. Accepting S￿ s o⁄er at price of 6 generates 10￿9￿6 = ￿5
and rejecting it generates 5 ￿ 9 = ￿4. Thus, it is optimal for B to reject the o⁄er. Moving back
to Stage 2, if S chooses ￿Challenge,￿ S anticipates that with probability one, her o⁄er at price of
6 will be rejected by B in the next stage, thus S anticipates that, as " becomes small, the payo⁄
is approximately equal to 7 ￿ 9 = ￿2 if her signal is high (equal to sh
S) and to 5 ￿ 9 = ￿4 if the
signal is low (equal to s‘
S). On the contrary, if S chooses ￿Not Challenge,￿ S guarantees a payo⁄ of
10. Thus, regardless of her signal, it is optimal for S not to challenge. Moving back to Stage 1, B
￿knows￿ that S does not challenge regardless of her signal. Now, suppose that B receives the high
signal sh
B. Then, as " becomes small, B believes with high probability that the true state is ￿H
so that his expected payo⁄ approximately results in 14 ￿ 10 = 4. This is larger than 0, which B
obtains when announcing ￿High.￿Therefore, it is optimal for B to announce ￿Low.￿Obviously, this
reasoning also shows that when B has received the low signal s‘
B, it is optimal for her to announce
￿Low.￿ 13
As we will see in the next section, the fact that the MR mechanism cannot induce even approx-
imate truth-telling under information perturbations is closely related to the fact that the social
choice function we tried to implement is not Maskin monotonic. But before we turn to a more
general analysis of the non-robustness of subgame-perfect implementation using MR mechanisms,
we review Maskin￿ s necessity result on Nash implementation, and explain why the social choice
function we try to implement in this example is not Maskin monotonic.
2.5 This example does not satisfy Maskin-monotonicity
2.5.1 Maskin￿ s Necessity Result on Nash implementation
Recall that a social choice function f on state space ￿ is Maskin monotonic if for all pair of states
of nature (preference pro￿les) ￿
0
and ￿
00
if a = f(￿
0
) and
n
(i;b)
￿
￿ ￿ui(a;￿
0
) ￿ ui(b;￿
0
)
o
￿
n
(i;b)
￿
￿ ￿ui(a;￿
00
) ￿ ui(b;￿
00
)
o
13To establish belief consistency, we need to ￿nd a sequence of totally mixed strategies that converges toward the
pure strategies described above and so that beliefs obtained by Bayes￿rule along this sequence also converge toward
the beliefs describe above. It is easy to see that under any sequence of totally mixed strategies converging toward
the pure strategies described above, the induced sequence of beliefs about ￿ will converge toward ￿
" conditioned on
private signals along the equilibrium path of the pure-strategy equilibrium. When B is o⁄ered the good at price of 6,
S has deviated from the equilibrium path due to the ￿trembles.￿ Beliefs about ￿ are then determined by the relative
probability that S has trembled after the di⁄erent signals. For instance, if one chooses a sequence of totally mixed
strategies under which it becomes in￿nitely more likely that S has trembled after receiving s
‘
S rather than when
receiving s
h
S, then B will assign probability close to one to S receiving signal s
‘
S.
10(i.e., no individual ranks a lower when moving from ￿
0
to ￿
00
), then a = f(￿
00
): Here ui(a;￿)
denotes player i￿ s utility from outcome a in state ￿. A social choice function (SCF) f is said to
be Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism ￿ = (M;g) where m = (m1;:::;mn) 2 M =
M1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ Mn denotes a strategy pro￿le and g : M ! A is the outcome function (which maps
strategies into outcomes), and if for any ￿ the Nash equilibrium outcome of that mechanism in
state ￿ is precisely f(￿). Then, Maskin (1999) shows that if f is Nash implementable, it must be
Maskin monotonic.
Let us summarize the proof, which we shall refer to again below. By way of contradiction, if f
were not Maskin monotonic, then there would exist ￿
0
and ￿
00
such that for any player i and any
alternative b
ui(f(￿
0
);￿
0
) ￿ ui(b;￿
0
) =) ui(f(￿
0
);￿
00
) ￿ ui(b;￿
00
) (I)
and nevertheless f(￿
0
) 6= f(￿
00
): But at the same time if f is Nash-implementable there exists a
mechanism ￿ = (M;g) such that f(￿
0
) = g(m￿
￿
0) for some Nash equilibrium m￿
￿
0 of the game ￿(￿
0
).
By de￿nition of Nash equilibrium, we must have
ui(f(￿
0
);￿
0
) = ui(g(m￿
￿
0);￿
0
) ￿ ui(g(mi;m￿
￿i;￿
0);￿
0
);8mi:
But then, from (I) we must also have
ui(f(￿
0
);￿
00
) = ui(g(m￿
￿
0);￿
00
) ￿ ui(g(mi;m￿
￿i;￿
0);￿
00
);8mi;
so that f(￿
0
) is also a Nash equilibrium outcome in state ￿
00
. But then if the mechanism implements
f; we must have f(￿
0
) = f(￿
00
); a contradiction.
2.5.2 The social choice function in our example is not Maskin monotonic
It is easy to show that the social choice function in our Hart-Moore example is not Maskin
monotonic. The set of social outcomes (or alternatives) A is de￿ned as:14
A =
￿
(q;yB;yS) 2 [0;1] ￿ R2 such that yB + yS ￿ 0
￿
;
where q is the probability that the good is traded from S to B; yB;yS are the transfers of B and
S respectively; and the utility functions of the seller and the buyer are respectively:
uS(q;yB;yS;￿) = yS
and
uB(q;yB;yS;￿) = ￿q + yB:
The two states of the world are ￿H and ￿L, which correspond respectively to the good being
14The sum yS + yB can be negative to allow for penalties paid to a third party.
11of high, and of low quality. We have just seen that if an SCF f under which trade occurs with
probability one is Maskin monotonic, then we must have:
f (￿H) = f (￿L):
The social choice function we seek to implement requires that
f (￿L) = (1;￿10;10);
f (￿H) = (1;￿14;14):
Clearly f (￿L) 6= f (￿H); but the buyer ranks outcome (1;￿10;10) at least as high under ￿L as
under ￿H; while the seller has the same preferences in the two states. Thus, f is not Maskin
monotonic, so Maskin￿ s result implies that this f is not Nash implementable. It is implementable
by a Moore-Repullo (MR) mechanism under common knowledge, but it is not implementable by
this mechanism under information perturbations.
Our analysis in the next two sections is motivated by the following questions: (1) Is the nonex-
istence of truth-telling equilibria in arbitrarily small information perturbations of the above MR
mechanism linked to the SCF f being non Maskin monotonic? (2) Is the existence of a sequence of
bad sequential equilibria in arbitrarily small information perturbations of the above MR mechanism,
directly linked to f being non-Maskin monotonic?
In Section 3, we consider a more general version of the MR mechanism and link the failure
of MR mechanisms to implement truth-telling in equilibrium under information perturbations to
the lack of Maskin monotonicity of the corresponding SCF. Then in Section 4, we consider any
sequential mechanism that implements a non-Maskin monotonic SCF (more generally, social choice
correspondences (SCC), formally de￿ned in Section 4.2.1) under common knowledge, and show that
for an arbitrarily small information perturbation of the game there exists a bad sequential equi-
librium whose outcome remains bounded away from the good equilibrium outcome under common
knowledge, even when the size of the perturbation tends to zero.
3 More general Moore-Repullo mechanisms
Moore and Repullo (1988) consider a more general class of extensive form mechanisms, which
we shall refer to as ￿MR mechanisms￿ . Under complete information, Moore and Repullo (1988)
consider environments where utilities are transferable and show that truth telling is a unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium in the MR mechanisms. Since this is the most hospitable environment
for subgame-perfect implementation, and because most contracting settings are in economies with
money, we focus on it.
123.1 Setup
Let there be two players 1 and 2; whose preferences over a social decision d 2 D are given by
(￿1;￿2) 2 ￿1 ￿ ￿2 = ￿ where ￿i =
￿
￿1
i;:::;￿n
i
￿
for each i = 1;2.15 The players have utility
functions
u1((d;t1;t2);￿1) = U1 (d;￿1) ￿ t1
and
u2((d;t1;t2);￿2) = U2 (d;￿2) + t2;
where d is a collective decision, t1 and t2 are monetary transfers.16 Preference characteristics (￿1;￿2)
are common knowledge between the two parties, but not veri￿able by a third party.
Let f = (D;T1;T2) be a social choice function where for each (￿1;￿2) 2 ￿1￿ ￿2 the social
decision is d = D(￿1;￿2) and the transfers are (t1;t2) = (T1 (￿1;￿2);T2 (￿1;￿2)):
Moore and Repullo (1988) propose the following class of mechanisms. These mechanisms involve
two phases, where phase i is designed so as to elicit truthful revelation of ￿i: Each phase in turn
consists of three stages. The game begins with phase 1, in which player 1 announces ￿1 and then
carries on with phase 2 in which player 2 announces ￿2. Phase 1 proceeds as follows:
1. Player 1 announces a preference ￿1; and we proceed to stage 2.
2. If player 2 announces ￿1 and ￿1 = ￿1, then phase 1 ends and we proceed to phase 2. If player
2￿ s announcement ￿1 does not agree, (i.e., ￿1 6= ￿1) then player 2 ￿challenges￿ and we proceed
to stage 3.
3. Player 1 chooses between
fx;tx + ￿g
and
fy;ty + ￿g;
where x = x(￿1;￿1) and y = y(￿1;￿1) depend on both ￿1 and ￿1 and ￿ is a positive number
suitably chosen (see below) and (x;y;tx;ty) are such that
U1 (x;￿1) ￿ tx > U1 (y;￿1) ￿ ty
and
U1 (x;￿1) ￿ tx < U1 (y;￿1) ￿ ty:
If player 1 chooses fx;tx + ￿g; which proves player 2 wrong in his challenge (in the Hart-
Moore example above, this corresponds to the buyer refusing the o⁄er at price 6), then player
15Moore and Repullo (1988) allow for an in￿nite state space but impose bounds on the utility functions.
16Because we do not assume that the prior on ￿ is a product measure, the product structure of ￿ = ￿1 ￿ ￿2 is
not crucial to our results. To see this, note that given any ￿nite set of states of nature ￿ and utility functions ui :
￿￿A ! R for each player i, we can identify ￿i with the collection of fui(￿;￿)g￿2￿. Now, de￿ne ~ ui : ￿1￿￿2￿A ! R
as follows: for ￿i = ui(￿;￿) we set ~ ui(￿;￿i) := ui(￿;￿). This setting is equivalent to the former one.
131 pays t1 = tx +￿ and player 2 receives t2 = tx ￿￿ and a third party receives 2￿: However,
if player 1 chooses fy;ty + ￿g, which con￿rms player 2￿ s challenge (in the above Hart-Moore
example, this corresponds to the buyer taking up the o⁄er at price 6), then player 1 pays
t1 = ty + ￿ and player 2 receives t2 = ty + ￿. The game ends here.
Phase 2 is the same as phase 1 with the roles of players 1 and 2 reversed (i.e., with player 2
announcing ￿2 in the ￿rst stage of that second phase). We use the notation stage 1.2, for example,
to refer to phase 1, stage 2.
The Moore-Repullo argument applies as follows when the state of nature ￿ is common knowledge:
If player 1 lies at stage 1:1, then player 2 will challenge, and at stage 1.3 player 1 will ￿nd it optimal
to choose fy;ty + ￿g: If ￿ is su¢ ciently large, then at stage 1, anticipating player 2￿ s subsequent
challenge, player 1 will ￿nd it optimal to announce the truth and thereby implement the social
choice function f. Moreover, player 2 will be happy with receiving ty +￿: If player 1 tells the truth
at stage 1:1 then player 2 will not challenge because she knows that player 1 will choose fx;tx + ￿g
at stage 1.3 which will cause player 2 to pay the ￿ne of ￿.
3.2 Perturbing the information structure
We now show that this result does not hold for small perturbations of the information structure
of the following form: Each agent i = 1;2 receives a signal s
k;l
i where k and l are both integers in
f1;:::;ng; the set of signals of player i is denoted Si. We assume that the prior joint probability
distribution ￿" over the product of signal pairs and state of nature is such that, for each (k;l) :
￿"(s
k;l
1 ;s
k;l
2 ;￿k
1;￿l
2) = ￿(￿k
1;￿l
2)[1 ￿ " ￿ "2]
(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿"(s
k;l1
1 ;s
k2;l
2 ;￿k
1;￿l
2) = ￿(￿k
1;￿l
2)
"
n2 ￿ 1
for (k2;l1) 6= (k;l)
￿"(s
k1;l1
1 ;s
k2;l2
2 ;￿k
1;￿l
2) = ￿(￿k
1;￿l
2)
"2
n4 ￿ n2 for k1 6= k or l2 6= l
where ￿ is a complete information prior over states of nature and signal pairs (i.e., a prior satisfying
￿(s
k1;l1
1 ;s
k2;l2
2 ;￿k
1;￿l
2) = 0 whenever (ki;li) 6= (k;l) for some player i). In the above expressions, we
abuse notation and write: ￿(￿k
1;￿‘
2) for the marg￿(￿)(￿k
1;￿‘
2). This corresponds to an information
perturbation such that each player i￿ s signal is much more informative about his own preferences
than about those of the other player. Note that in an intuitive sense the prior ￿" is close to ￿ when
" is small; this is also true in a formal sense.17
17For concreteness we specify the supremum-norm topology when discussing the convergence of the priors. That
is, let P denote the set of priors over ￿ ￿ S with the following metric d : P ￿ P ! R+: for any ￿;￿
0
2 P,
d(￿;￿
0
) = max
(￿;s)2￿￿S
j￿(￿;s) ￿ ￿
0
(￿;s)j:
So, when we say ￿
k ! ￿, we mean that d(￿
k;￿) ! 0 as k ! 1.
14We begin by considering pure strategy equilibria. For this purpose, we make use of the concept
of strategy-proofness:
De￿nition 1. An SCF f is strategy-proof if for each player i and each ￿i;
ui(f(￿i;￿￿i);￿i) ￿ ui(f(￿0
i;￿￿i);￿i) for all ￿0
i and ￿￿i:
In other words, a social choice function f is strategy-proof if telling the truth is a weakly
dominant strategy through a direct mechanism associated with f whereby the players are asked
to announce their preference parameter. Strategy-proofness implies a weak version of Maskin
monotonicity, namely, that for any ￿;￿0 such that
8i 2 N and 8b 2 Anff(￿)g : ui(f(￿);￿i) ￿ ui(b;￿i) ) ui(f(￿);￿0
i) > ui(b;￿0
i);
we have f(￿) = f(￿0).18 As a corollary, strategy-proofness also implies the usual Maskin monotonic-
ity condition when preferences over outcomes in f(￿) are strict, where f(￿) denotes the range of
f.
Theorem 1. Suppose that a non strategy-proof SCF f is implementable by a MR mechanism under
complete information. Fix any complete information prior ￿. There exists a sequence of priors
f￿"g">0 that converges to the complete information prior ￿ such that there is no pure equilibrium
strategies under which player 1 tells the truth in phase 1 and player 2 tells the truth in phase 2.
Proof of Theorem 1. Under the signal structure (￿ ￿ ￿), if player 2 sees that player 1￿ s announce-
ment about ￿1 is di⁄erent from her signal, and she believes player 1 is reporting ￿truthfully,￿she
disregards her own information on ￿1 and follows player 1￿ s announcement (and symmetrically for
player 1 vis-a-vis player 2 regarding signals over ￿2).
Now, suppose that f is not strategy-proof. Then there is a player, say player 1, and states
￿h
1;￿k
1;￿l
2 such that
u1(f(￿h
1;￿l
2);￿h
1) < u1(f(￿k
1;￿l
2);￿h
1):
We claim that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in which player 1 reports truthfully in phase
1 and player 2 reports truthfully in phase 2. By way of contradiction, suppose there is such an
equilibrium, and suppose that player 1 gets signal s
h;l
1 and player 2 gets signal s
h;l
2 : Player 1 would
like to announce ￿￿k
1￿ if she expects that subsequent to such an announcement, player 2 agrees with
￿￿k
1￿ as well and then tells the truth in phase 2 so that the outcome is f(￿k
1;￿l
2): But this is precisely
18If f(￿) 6= f(￿
0), it must be that there is some player i and some ^ ￿￿i such that f(￿i;￿￿i) = f(￿i;^ ￿￿i) 6= f(￿
0
i;^ ￿￿i);
and so in particular ￿i 6= ￿
0
i. Hence, strategy-proofness of f implies that for this player i, ui(f(￿i;￿￿i);￿i) =
ui(f(￿i;^ ￿￿i);￿i) ￿ ui(f(￿
0
i;^ ￿￿i);￿i) and ui(f(￿i;￿￿i);￿i) = ui(f(￿i;^ ￿￿i);￿
0
i) ￿ ui(f(￿
0
i;^ ￿￿i);￿
0
i); and setting b =
f(￿
0
i;^ ￿￿i) yields the weak monotonicity condition. Finally, note that if preferences over outcomes in f(￿) are
strict, then ui(f(￿i;￿￿i);￿
0
i) = ui(f(￿i;^ ￿￿i);￿
0
i) < ui(f(￿
0
i;^ ￿￿i);￿
0
i) and therefore the above argument yields the
usual Maskin monotonicity condition. Our weak monotonicity is closely related to conditions proposed by Dasgupta,
Hammond, Maskin (1979). In that paper, strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized via the concept of
￿independent person-by-person monotonicity￿which is stronger than our condition of weak Maskin monotonicity.
15what will happen: In a fully revealing equilibrium, player 2 will infer that player 1 must have seen a
s
k;~ l
1 -type signal, therefore player 2 will believe with high probability that the state must be (￿k
1;￿l
2).
Consequently, player 2 will not challenge player 1￿ s announcement. But then, anticipating this,
player 1 will announce ￿￿k
1￿ and thereby receive f(￿k
1;￿l
2) instead of f(￿h
1;￿l
2): This in turn shows
that there does not exist a truthfully revealing equilibrium in pure strategies.
Theorem 1 links the non-robustness of the MR mechanism to the failure of Maskin monotonicity
of the social choice function to be implemented. For instance, in the Hart-Moore example in Section
2, the social choice function is not Maskin monotonic and preferences over f(￿) are strict, so the
social choice function in that example is not strategy-proof.
Note that the above result does not preclude the existence of mixed strategy equilibria where
truth-telling by one or two players in each phase is robust to small information perturbations.
Moreover, the above result provides a necessary condition for the robustness of truth-telling by
player i in phase i, without requiring truth-telling by player j as well.
Next, we turn attention to mixed-strategy equilibrium. If we require that both players tell
(at least, approximately) the truth in each of the two phases, then no social choice function f =
(D;T1;T2) can be implemented by the general MR mechanism in such a way that truth-telling
by both players in each phase, is a sequential equilibrium outcome which is robust to information
perturbations.
More formally, in the Appendix we prove the following:
Theorem 2. Suppose that an SCF f is implementable by a MR mechanism under complete
information. Fix any complete information prior ￿. There exists a sequence of priors f￿"g">0
that converges to the complete information prior ￿ such that there is no sequence of sequential
equilibrium strategy pro￿les that converges to truth-telling.
Here is an intuition for why requiring approximate truth-telling by both players in each phase
precludes robust implementation by the MR mechanism. Suppose that both players receive a signal
which is highly correlated with the true state. Player 1 plays ￿rst in phase 1, so if player 1 announces
a signal that is highly correlated with some state ^ ￿, then player 2 (playing second in phase 1) will
believe that player 1 has told the truth (because by assumption player 1￿ s announcement is close to
truthful). But the mechanism is built in such a way that player 2 never wants to challenge player
1 if she thinks that player 1 is telling the truth (otherwise at stage 3 player 2 will be punished), so
player 2, if she is not challenging, will also announce ^ ￿ and so will not follow her private signal and
thus she is not reporting truthfully.
Let us make two remarks at this stage. First, the non-robustness of truth-telling as a sequential
equilibrium outcome of the MR mechanism is of interest because truth-telling is cognitively simple,
and also because the non-existence of a truthful sequential equilibrium implies the non-existence
of a desirable pure equilibrium, and implementation theory has mainly focused on pure-strategy
equilibria. Second, neither of the non-robustness results of this section rule out the possibility that
some SCF f can be implemented as the limit of mixed-strategy (non-truthful) sequential equilibrium
16outcomes.19 However, in the next section, we will show that if f is not Maskin monotonic but yet can
be implemented by the MR or by any other extensive form mechanism under common knowledge,
then there always exist arbitrarily small information perturbations under which there also exist
sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes.
4 Any mechanism
In this section, we go beyond MR mechanisms and consider the set of all extensive form mechanisms.
Suppose a non-Maskin monotonic SCF is implemented by a (not necessarily MR) mechanism under
complete information. Then, we show that there always exists a ￿bad￿ sequential equilibrium in
arbitrarily small information perturbations of that mechanism. We begin by presenting the argu-
ment in a nutshell, using the Hart-Moore example to illustrate our point. Finally, we proceed to
state and establish a more general result.
4.1 Overview of the main result
In this subsection we state the main result and provide the reader with an intuition for the proof.
The main idea is that introducing just a small amount of incomplete information markedly enlarges
the set of (sequential) beliefs that are consistent with Bayesian rationality. As a result, one can
turn an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form mechanism that implements a non-Maskin
monotonic SCF f under common knowledge into a sequential equilibrium of the perturbed game.
More speci￿cally, suppose there are n players, and each player i has a state dependent utility
function ui(a;￿) over outcomes (or alternatives) a 2 A: In the perturbations we consider, players
do not observe the state of nature ￿ directly, but are informed about it through private signals. An
extensive form mechanism ￿ together with a state ￿ 2 ￿ de￿nes an extensive form game ￿(￿); Let
SPE(￿(￿)) denote the set of subgame-perfect equilibria of the game ￿(￿): A SCF f is said to be
subgame-perfect implementable if there exists a mechanism ￿ = (M;g) such that for each state ￿,
every subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome coincides with f(￿). Here is an informal statement of
the main result:
Main Result: Assume ￿nite state space and ￿nite strategy spaces.20 Assume, further, that a
mechanism ￿ subgame-perfect implements a non-Maskin monotonic SCF f under complete infor-
mation. Then there exists a sequence of information perturbations parametrized by some " and a
corresponding sequence of sequential equilibria of the games induced by ￿ under this sequence of
perturbations, whose outcomes do not converge to f(￿) in some state ￿ as " ! 0:
In particular, under the usual additional conditions where Maskin monotonicity is su¢ cient for
Nash implementation, this result implies the following: whenever an SCF cannot be implemented
19For conditions under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a perfect information game
remains an equilibrium outcome in perturbed games, see Takahashi and Tercieux (2011).
20In the Appendix we extend the result to the case of countable strategy sets.
17using static mechanisms (with Nash equilibrium as the solution concept), there is no hope of im-
plementing it using sequential mechanisms if we want such mechanisms to be robust to information
perturbations.
Intuition for the proof: Suppose that the SCF f is not Maskin monotonic. Then, there exist
￿0 and ￿00 such that for any player i 2 N and any alternative b 2 A
ui(f(￿0);￿0) ￿ ui(b;￿0) =) ui(f(￿0);￿00) ￿ ui(b;￿00) (I)
and nevertheless f(￿0) 6= f(￿00): At the same time, since the extensive form mechanism ￿ implements
f; there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) m￿0 in state ￿
0
such that g(m￿0) = f(￿0): But
then using the same argument as in the proof of Maskin￿ s theorem summarized in Section 2 above,
m￿0 is also a Nash equilibrium in state ￿00; and necessarily a ￿bad￿Nash equilibrium since f(￿0) 6=
f(￿00):
The remaining part of the proof follows from the fact that one can use information perturbations
to ￿rationalize￿ this bad Nash equilibrium and turn it into a sequential equilibrium of the perturbed
games, in the same way as the construction in Section 2 above showed the non-robustness of the
particular MR mechanism considered in that section.
As a concrete example, consider again the MR mechanism studied in Section 2. Under common
knowledge of the state, it is a Nash equilibrium for B to announce ￿L at Stage 1 and for S to
never challenge at Stage 2. However, this is a bad Nash equilibrium and it is ￿not￿ a sequential
equilibrium. In particular, if Stage 3 were to be reached under common knowledge, then B would
just infer that S deviated from the equilibrium, but never update his beliefs about the true valuation
￿ or about S￿ s perception of ￿:
However, perturbing the signals about ￿ changes the picture radically. Now, if stage 3 is reached,
then B updates his beliefs about which signal S might have seen. In particular, if B￿ s updating puts
enough weight on S having received the low signal s‘
S, then B will not take the o⁄er at price 6; then,
anticipating this at stage 2, S will indeed not challenge in equilibrium. Note that by perturbing
the signal structure we have enlarged the set of consistent beliefs: under common knowledge it
could not be a consistent belief that S saw the low state ￿L if B ￿knew￿that the state was ￿H; but
this can become consistent under the perturbation. This is the key to how the perturbation turns
a bad (non-sequential) Nash equilibrium of the game with complete information into a sequential
equilibrium in the perturbed game.
4.2 A more formal statement of the main result
Now, we move from intuition and examples to the formal statement of the result, and refer the
reader to the Appendix for the formal proof. In the ￿rst reading, the reader can skip the rest of
Section 4 here and go directly to Section 5 without loosing much of the main idea of the paper.
184.2.1 The environment
In what follows, we consider a more general environment, with a ￿nite set N = f1;:::;ng of players,
with n ￿ 2; and a set A of social alternatives, or outcomes. From now on, we no longer assume that
agents have quasi-linear preferences with transferable money, as was needed for MR mechanisms.
Each player i has a state dependent utility function ui : A￿￿ ! R, where ￿ is a ￿nite set of states
of nature.21 Players do not observe the state directly, but are informed of the state via signals.
Player i￿ s signal set is Si which, for simplicity, we identify with ￿. A signal pro￿le is an element
s = (s1;:::;sn) 2 S ￿ ￿i2NSi. When the realized signal pro￿le is s; each player i observes only his
own signal si. We let ￿ denote the prior probability over ￿￿S. We write ￿(￿jsi) for the probability
measure over ￿ ￿ S conditional on si. Let s￿ be the signal pro￿le in which each player￿ s signal is
￿. Complete information refers to the environments in which ￿(￿;s) = 0 whenever s 6= s￿ (￿ will
be then referred to as a complete information prior). Under complete information, the state, and
hence the full pro￿le of preferences, is always common knowledge among players.
We will assume for each i and ￿; the marginal distribution on i￿ s signals places strictly positive
weight on each of i￿ s signals in every state, i.e., ￿(s￿
i) ￿ [margSi￿](s￿
i) > 0; so that Bayes￿rule is
well-de￿ned. Note that in case ￿ is a complete information prior, this implies in particular that for
each (￿;s￿) 2 ￿ ￿ S : ￿(￿;s￿) > 0.
A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a set-valued mapping F : ￿ ￿ A. We have focused on
social choice functions (SCFs) in the previous sections. In this section, we generalize our arguments
to encompass social choice correspondences (SCCs).
Since we consider more general extensive form mechanisms than MR mechanisms, we need to
introduce some notation. Most of the notation used here is consistent with Moore and Repullo
(1988). The reader is referred to that paper for the de￿nition and notation of extensive form
mechanisms. We restrict attention to mechanisms that are multi-stage games with observed actions,
meaning at each history h, all players know the entire history of the play, and if more than one
player moves at h, they do so simultaneously.22 We also assume that the mechanism has a ￿nite
number of stages. The class of mechanisms we consider in the present paper is exactly the same
as the one Moore and Repullo (1988) allowed. A mechanism is then an extensive game form
￿ = (H;M;Z;g) where: (1) H is the set of all histories; (2) M = M1￿￿￿￿￿Mn; Mi = ￿h2HMi(h)
for all i where Mi(h) denotes the set of available messages for i at history h; (3) Z describes the
history that immediately follows history h given that the strategy pro￿le m has been played; and
(4) g is the outcome function that maps the set of terminal histories (denoted HT) into the set of
outcomes (A).
The following notation will be useful: An element of M(h) = M1(h)￿￿￿￿￿Mn(h), say m(h) =
(m1(h);:::;mn(h)) is a message pro￿le at h while mi(h) is i￿ s message at h. If #Mi(h) > 1 and
#Mj(h) > 1 then players i and j move simultaneously after history h, whereas if #Mi(h) > 1 and
21One can always interpret a partition over ￿ as corresponding to a particular player i￿ s set of types ￿i. Thus the
set up considered in the previous sections is indeed a special case of that analyzed in this section.
22This includes games of perfect information (sequential and observed moves) as a special case.
19#Mj(h) = 1 for all j 6= i then player i is the only one to move. Histories and messages are tied
together by the property that M(h) = fm : (h;m) 2 Hg. An element of Mi is a pure strategy; and
an element of M is a pure strategy pro￿le.
There is an initial history ; 2 H, and ht =: (;;m1;m2;:::;mt￿1) is the history at the end of
period t, where for each k; mk 2 M(hk). If for t0 ￿ t + 1;ht0 = (ht;mt;:::;mt0￿1), then ht0 follows
history ht. As ￿ contains ￿nitely many stages, there is a set of terminal histories23 HT ￿ H such
that HT = fh 2 H :there is no h0 following hg. Given any strategy pro￿le m and any history
h, there is a unique terminal history denoted by hT[m;h]. Formally, let Z : M ￿ H ! H be the
mapping where
Z[m;h] =
(
(h;m(h)) if h = 2 HT
h otherwise
is the history that immediately follows h whenever possible given that strategy pro￿le m has
been played; and so hT[m;h] = limk!1 Zk[m;h] where Zk[m;h] = Z[m;Zk￿1[m;h]]. Finally, the
outcome function g : HT ! A speci￿es an outcome for each terminal history. We will also denote
g(m;h) the outcome that obtains when players use strategy pro￿le m starting from history h, i.e.,
g(m;h) = g(hT[m;h]). In what follows, we only consider ￿nite mechanisms:
Assumption A1. Mi (h) is ￿nite for each i and h:
Remark 1.: This assumption is useful when using sequential equilibrium and avoids technical
complications due to the use of countably in￿nite (or uncountable) spaces. In the Appendix, we
provide additional assumptions on the class of mechanisms so that our result can be extended to
countable message spaces. This extension is important because the literature often uses integer
games (i.e., games where one dimension of the message space is the set of positive integers) as part
of implementing mechanisms.24
A mechanism ￿ together with a state ￿ 2 ￿ de￿nes an extensive game ￿(￿). A (pure strategy)
Nash equilibrium for the complete information game ￿(￿) is an element m￿ 2 M such that, for each
player i, ui(g(m￿;;));￿) ￿ ui(g((mi;m￿
￿i);;);￿) for all mi 2 Mi. A (pure strategy) subgame-perfect
equilibrium for the game ￿(￿) is an element m￿ 2 M such that, for each player i, ui(g(m￿;h);￿) ￿
ui(g((mi;m￿
￿i);h);￿) for all mi 2 Mi and all h 2 HnHT. Recall that SPE(￿(￿)) denotes the set
of subgame-perfect equilibria of the game ￿(￿) and NE(￿(￿)) denotes the set of Nash equilibria of
the game ￿(￿). We say that a mechanism implements an SCC F in subgame-perfect equilibrium,
or simply SPE-implements F, if for each (￿;s￿) 2 ￿ ￿ S; we have g(SPE(￿(￿));;) = F(￿).
Given a prior ￿, the mechanism determines a Bayesian game ￿(￿) in which each player￿ s type is
his signal, and after observing his signal, player i selects a (pure) strategy from the set Mi. In what
follows, whenever players face uncertainty about the state and other player￿ s signals, they possess
23Note that M(h) = fm : (h;m) 2 Hg = ; for any h 2 HT.
24Our results do not critically depend on the countability assumption. We believe that our results would hold
for arbitrary mechanisms if we were to use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991b)) instead of
sequential equilibrium as the solution concept.
20a probabilistic belief over this uncertainty and with respect to this belief, they aim to maximize
expected utility.25 A strategy pro￿le ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿n) lists a strategy for each player i where
￿i : Si ! Mi and ￿i(ht;si) is a message in Mi(ht) given history ht and signal si. Alternatively, we
will sometimes let ￿i be a (mixed) behavior strategy, i.e., a function that maps the set of possible
histories and signals into the set of probability distributions over messages: ￿i(￿jht;si) 2 ￿(Mi(ht))
is the probability distribution over Mi(ht) given history ht and signal si:
With this notation in place we can re-state the de￿nition of sequential equilibrium as spe-
cialized to these multi-stage games of observed actions. A sequential equilibrium is a pro￿le of
assessment (or beliefs) ￿ and strategies ￿ which satisfy both consistency and sequential rationality.
Here consistency is the requirement that there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategy pro￿les
￿n converging to ￿ such that the beliefs ￿n computed from ￿n using Bayes￿rule converge to ￿;
Sequential rationality means that for each period t and history ht￿1 up to t ￿ 1; the continuation
strategies are optimal for each player i given the opponents￿strategies and his belief ￿i. A more
formal de￿nition of sequential equilibrium can be found in the Appendix (Section 7.2).
4.2.2 The existence of a bad sequential equilibrium with almost-perfect information
Although we already introduced the de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity for social choice functions
in Section 2, we need to extend it to social choice correspondences. A social choice correspondence
F on a payo⁄ relevant state space ￿ is Maskin monotonic if for all pair of states of nature ￿0 and
￿00 if a 2 F(￿0) and
f(i;b)
￿ ￿ui(a;￿0) ￿ ui(b;￿0)g ￿ f(i;b)
￿ ￿ui(a;￿00) ￿ ui(b;￿00)g (￿)
(i.e., no individual ranks a lower when moving from ￿0 to ￿00) then a 2 F(￿00). Henceforth, we
assume that A is a Hausdor⁄ topological space. We are now in a position to provide a more formal
statement of our main theorem.
Theorem 3. Assume A1. Suppose that a mechanism ￿ SPE implements a non-Maskin monotonic
SCC F. Fix any complete information prior ￿. There exists a sequence of priors f￿"g">0 that
converges to a complete information prior ￿ and a corresponding sequence of sequential equilibrium
assessments and strategy pro￿les f(￿";￿")g">0 such that as " tends to 0, g(￿"(s￿);;) ! a = 2 F(￿)
for some ￿ 2 ￿ and some outcome a 2 A.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 2. The above theorem shows the following: under the usual conditions ensuring that
Maskin monotonicity is su¢ cient for Nash implementation, whenever a SCC cannot be implemented
using static mechanisms, this SCC cannot be implemented using an extensive-form mechanism that
is robust to the introduction of a small amount of incomplete information.
25All the results extend to more general representations for preferences under uncertainty. The interested reader
is referred to Kunimoto and Tercieux (2009) for details.
21Remark 3. While non-Maskin monotonic SCFs cannot be robustly implemented, things are quite
di⁄erent for Maskin monotonic SCFs. Here we restrict our focus to SCF￿ s rather than SCCs. In
the Appendix we extend the argument to the case of SCCs.
What appears as a natural candidate for ￿robust implementation￿of a SCF amounts to con-
structing a Nash implementable mechanism with the following two properties: (1) there exists at
least one strict Nash equilibrium; and (2) the map from information structures to Nash equilibria
has a closed graph, so adding a small amount of incomplete information only slightly increases
the set of Nash equilibria. In the Appendix, we formalize the above two properties and propose a
de￿nition of robust Nash implementation.
To see this, note that the ￿rst property ensures that the strict Nash equilibrium continues to
be a strict (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium for any nearby environment and hence that there is always
a good equilibrium for any nearby environment. The second property in turn ensures that all Nash
equilibria will continue to have outcomes that are close to the desired outcome for any nearby
environment.
Regarding the ￿rst property, the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in a mechanism that
implements a SCF can easily be ensured under a slight strengthening of Maskin monotonicity,
namely strong Maskin monotonicity. In the Appendix, we show that this is also the case for SCCs.
As to the second property, in many situations, Nash implementation of Maskin monotonic SCFs
can be achieved using ￿nite mechanisms (see Saijo (1988)). Routine arguments then imply that
the second property is satis￿ed.26
For the case of in￿nite mechanisms, the argument is relegated to the Appendix, which provides
su¢ cient conditions under which one can ensure that properties (1) and (2) above are satis￿ed.
There we take care of SCCs as well as SCFs. Interestingly, these su¢ cient conditions are satis￿ed
by any Maskin monotonic SCF in quasi-linear environments with money.
5 Outside options and the hold-up problem
Thus far, we have shown that the mechanisms used by proponents of the ￿implementation critique"
of the property right theory of the ￿rm (e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 1999a) are themselves not robust to
small deviations from perfect information and common knowledge. That leaves open the question of
what role outside options (e.g., as induced by asset ownership as in Grossman and Hart (1986)) can
play in alleviating the hold-up problem in situations that depart more signi￿cantly from complete
or just symmetric information.
As a ￿rst step in this direction, we consider an environment with an ex ante investment stage
and where ex post bargaining takes place under one-sided asymmetric information. We present
an example where the presence of an outside option allows mechanisms that approximate ex ante
e¢ ciency. Moreover, we argue that static or sequential mechanisms without an outside option
26This property comes from the following two facts. First, a small change in the prior probability corresponds to a
small change in ex ante payo⁄s. Second, the pure Nash equilibrium correspondence is upper hemi continuous in the
space of payo⁄s.
22cannot do as well, which, in turn, we see as a justi￿cation for the role of ownership allocation in
contracting under incomplete information.
5.1 The set-up
Suppose there is a buyer (B) and a seller (S) of a single unit of an indivisible object with utility ~ v
to the buyer, where ~ v 2 fv; ￿ vg and ￿ v > v > 0. The utility of the seller for the object is assumed
to be always zero. Time is discrete, with a contracting period 0 where the good is o⁄ered to the
buyer at a prespeci￿ed price, an investment period 1/2 whereby the seller can increase the buyer￿ s
valuation for the good; and a trading period 1. Investment is unobservable as in Grossman-Hart
(1986). Moreover, we shall allow for the possibility that an outside option can be exerted in period
2 by one party if trade does not occur in period 1, and focus attention on the case where the outside
option yields utility v to whoever has the good at that point. A natural interpretation is that ￿ v is
the value the buyer and the seller can generate in their relationship and v is the default value that
can be generated outside of the relationship. The timing of the events is as follows:
t = 0 t = 1=2 t = 1 t = 2
Contract Investment i Trade speci￿ed by contract Outside Option (if any)
The seller may make an investment in period 1/2 that increases the probability that the good
is high quality, as in Che and Hausch (1999). Speci￿cally, suppose that at cost c(i) the seller
achieves v = ￿ v with probability i; where c(￿) is continuous, twice di⁄erentiable, and satis￿es c
0
(i) >
0;c
00
(i) > 0; c(0) = 0; c0(1) = +1, and c
0
(0) < ￿ v ￿v: The buyer will know the value of the good at
the beginning of period 1, while the seller will not, so there is one-sided asymmetric information.
5.2 Outside options as ownership
One can relate the outside option to the idea of ownership by taking the owner of the good to be
the party with the right to exercise the outside option. Thus, under seller ownership, if the seller
makes an o⁄er to the buyer but the buyer refuses the o⁄er, then the seller can always choose to
always exert his outside option and gets v:
This interpretation as ownership is consistent with other works in the property rights literature,
starting with Grossman and Hart (1986), where ownership of the assets of a ￿rm allows the owner
to make alternative use of these assets in case of disagreement in the ex post bargaining with the
other party(ies). This in turn enhances the owner￿ s ex post bargaining power and therefore it
increases the fraction of the ex post production surplus the owner can secure in this bargaining,
which, in turn, enhances the owner￿ s investment incentives. In our setting too, ownership of the
good will allow the seller to extract a higher price from a high-valuation buyer, and anticipating
this, the seller will invest a higher i in the relationship. What we show below is that no mechanism
23(contract) without an outside option can do as well as a contract with outside option to the seller
in inducing e¢ cient investment by the seller in period 1/2.
5.3 Ex Ante e¢ ciency and outside options
Under our assumptions, the ex-ante e¢ cient outcome is to trade whenever the good is high quality,
consume the outside option when the good is low quality,27 and set investment equal to i￿; where
i￿ 2 (0;1) is the solution to the following ￿rst-order condition:
￿ v ￿ v = c
0
(i￿):
The resulting total surplus is then
W￿ = i￿￿ v + (1 ￿ i￿)v ￿ c(i￿):
We will now show how a mechanism with an outside option can come arbitrarily close to this payo⁄.
In this setting, a mechanism takes as input the buyer￿ s announced value for the good, and
speci￿es a trade probability q; transfers yS and yB to the seller and buyer respectively, a probability
zS that the seller gets to keep the good if there is no trade, a probability zB that the buyer gets the
good in that case, and therefore the probability 1￿zB￿zS ￿ 0 that the good is destroyed when it is
not traded (the mechanism does not specify an investment level, nor condition other outcomes on it,
as investment is not observable). Thus the mechanism maps the buyer￿ s announcement ~ v 2 fv; ￿ vg
into A where A = f(q;yB;yS;zB;zS) 2 [0;1] ￿ R4
+j yS + yB ￿ 0; zB + zS ￿ 1g: In what follows,
we consider the case zS ￿ 1 (so that the seller gets the outside option whenever there is no trade,
regardless of the buyer￿ s announcement), and therefore the mechanism boils down to a mapping
f(~ v) such that f(v) = (q;y
B;y
S) (when the buyer announces v) and f(v) = (￿ q; ￿ yB; ￿ yS) (when the
buyer announces ￿ v).
Given that zS ￿ 1, for " > 0 small enough, the mechanism that implements (1;￿(￿ v￿"); ￿ v￿"))
when the buyer announces valuation ￿ v, and (0;0;0) when the buyer announces v satis￿es incentive
compatibility (it is a strictly dominant strategy for the buyer to report her valuation v truthfully),
individual rationality, and ex post e¢ ciency, i.e., trade occurs if and only if there are social gains
from trade.
Now suppose that the buyer and the seller agree on this mechanism with the outside option
v allocated to the seller at the contracting stage. Then, moving back to time t = 1=2; the seller
chooses the level of investment to maximize
i(￿ v ￿ ") + (1 ￿ i)v ￿ c(i):
Given our assumptions, the optimal investment level i￿ (for " > 0 small enough) is determined by
27From the viewpoint of social welfare it does not matter which party gets to use the outside option.
24the ￿rst-order condition:
￿ v ￿ " ￿ v = c
0
(i￿):
From the concavity of the problem, this is approximately the same as the ￿rst-best investment
when " is small. Thus, a simple contract with seller￿ s ownership can exactly implement an out-
come whose total surplus is arbitrarily close to the ￿rst best level; this is what we will mean by
￿approximate ex ante e¢ ciency.￿
5.4 Ex ante e¢ ciency cannot be approximated without outside options
As in the complete information case, a crucial question is: what exactly can be achieved with
contracts/mechanisms that do not use outside options, so that zS = zB = 0. Below, we show that
under buyer￿ s private information, any ￿outside-option-free￿contract between the buyer and the
seller leads to an outcome which remains bounded away from ex ante e¢ ciency.
First, note that if an SCF f that maps the true buyer￿ s valuation ~ v onto a triplet f(~ v) =
(~ q; ~ yB; ~ yS); and yields zero continuation utility to both parties if trade does not occur, is to be
implemented by some (static or sequential28) mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, it must be
at least weakly incentive compatible for the buyer to report truthfully. It is simple to show that f
is incentive compatible if and only if
v(￿ q ￿ q) ￿ y
B ￿ ￿ yB ￿ ￿ v(￿ q ￿ q): (1)
Below we prove that one cannot ￿nd SCFs with zS = zB = 0 that are incentive compatible and
approximately ex ante e¢ cient. To show this, suppose to the contrary that for any " > 0 there is
an incentive compatible mechanism f" whose ex ante total surplus is at least W￿ ￿ ". Then, the
associated probabilities i" of high quality must converge to i￿ ,the probabilities of trade q" and ￿ q"
must both converge to 1, and the di⁄erence in transfers (i.e. money ￿burnt￿ ) jy"
S￿y"
Bj and j￿ y"
S￿￿ y"
Bj
must both converge to 0. The incentive compatibility condition (1) then implies that jy"
B￿￿ y"
Bj ! 0;
and this, plus the fact that both jy"
S ￿ y"
Bj and j￿ y"
S ￿ ￿ y"
Bj ! 0, implies that j￿ y"
S ￿ y"
Sj ! 0 as well.
Moving back to time t = 1=2, the seller will choose investment i to maximize
i￿ y"
S + (1 ￿ i)y"
S ￿ c(i) = y"
S + i(￿ y"
S ￿ y"
S) ￿ c(i):
Because j￿ y"
S ￿y"
Sj ! 0 and c0 > 0; the solution i" to this problem converges to 0, so investment
falls far short of the ￿rst-best level, which is not consistent with the assumption that the ex ante
total surplus converges to W￿. We conclude that ex ante surplus must be bounded away from
e¢ ciency.
28Approximate ex ante e¢ ciency cannot be achieved by virtual implementation either, since incentive compatibility
is also necessary for virtual implementation to work. But precisely we show below that without outside options, one
cannot ￿nd SCFs that are both, approximately ex ante e¢ cient and incentive compatible.
25This establishes our claim that no approximately ex ante e¢ cient SCF can be implemented
by a mechanism that does not include an outside option (or some other change to the economic
environment), which, in turn, we see as a justi￿cation for the role of ownership allocation in
contracting under incomplete information.
5.5 Summary
Analyzing the hold-up problem in a setting with ex post asymmetric information, as we have done
in this section, yields an interesting new insight: outside options such as those induced by asset
ownership can help relax incentive compatibility constraints and thereby improve ex ante e¢ ciency
compared to what can be achieved through ￿ownership-free￿contracts/mechanisms.
6 Concluding remarks
We conclude by making a few additional remarks. First, the bad sequential equilibria in Section 4
survives a standard equilibrium selection criterion. Cho (1987) de￿nes forward induction equilib-
rium, which is an extension of the Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion in signaling games to
more general games. The key restriction in this equilibrium concept is that the belief system assigns
probability 0 to nodes in some information set h if this node can be reached only by ￿bad￿ deviations,
provided that other nodes in h can be reached by non-bad deviations. Here, ￿bad deviations￿ are
deviations with the following property: suppose that at any information set where the deviating
player can reach by deviating, players are playing best-responses against some arbitrary belief that
is consistent with that information set being reached. Then the deviation makes the deviating
player strictly worse o⁄ compared to his equilibrium payo⁄. In the Hart-Moore example developed
in Section 2, we can show that ￿Challenge￿is never a bad deviation for the seller. To see this,
note that when deviating to ￿Challenge,￿the seller may think that an information set under which
B believes that the state ￿H may occur with positive probability. Thus we can always pick an
appropriate belief (for instance, one that would assign probability 1 to ￿H) under which it is a best
reply for B to accept S￿ s o⁄er if S challenges. But we know that in such a case ￿Challenge￿by the
seller makes her strictly better o⁄ compared to the equilibrium, proving that ￿Challenge￿cannot
be a bad deviation.
Our second remark is that the non-robustness of subgame-perfect implementation does not
mean that implementation is hopeless, but, rather, suggests that we should further explore the
implications of Nash implementation. It is well-known that in many important contexts, Nash
implementation (or Maskin monotonicity) is quite demanding. For instance, a well-known result
by Muller and Sattherthwaite (1977) states that any onto and ex post e¢ cient social choice function
de￿ned on the domain of all strict preferences is dictatorial when there are at least three outcomes.
Maskin (1999) shows that with only two players, this result extends to social choice correspondences.
However, it has also been shown that, under some mild domain restrictions, for any social choice
function f, there is a stochastic social choice function that puts probability close to one on the same
26outcomes as f and that is Maskin monotonic (See Abreu and Sen (1991) and Matsushima (1988)
for the details of this approach).29 Indeed, we saw that the social choice function f we sought to
implement in this Hart-Moore example was not Maskin monotonic since f (￿L) = (1;￿10;10) 6=
f (￿H) = (1;￿14;14), and therefore not Nash implementable. However, the "-approximation of
that SCF de￿ned by
f" (￿L) = (1 ￿ ";￿10;10) 6= f (￿H) = (1 ￿ ";￿14;14);
is Maskin monotonic since for example, B strictly prefers (1￿";￿10;10) to (1;￿10￿11";10) when
￿ = ￿L = 10 but the reverse is true when ￿ = ￿H = 14: Hence, even if f is not Maskin monotonic and
therefore not Nash implementable, we can ￿nd an "-close stochastic SCF that is Maskin monotonic
and therefore Nash implementable for instance in the Moore and Repullo￿ s setting.30 However, the
stochastic nature of this mechanism is problematic in terms of renegotiation-proofness. For example,
if we consider the above social choice function f": with probability ", the planner must induce a
bad outcome under which trade does not occur.31 Given that there are gains from trade, agents will
de￿nitely have incentives to renegotiate. If this possibility is explicitly taken into account by the
contracting parties, then the social choice function is not going to be Nash implementable anymore.
Thus, stochasticity (or randomness) can help to robustly implement nearby e¢ cient social choice
functions but it also raises serious renegotiation-proofness issues.
Finally, we feel that laboratory experiments can be useful in assessing the importance of the
e⁄ect of information perturbations on the likelihood that truth-telling will still occur in equilib-
rium. Preliminary work by Aghion, Fehr, Holden and Wilkening (2009) suggests that the e⁄ect is
potentially large.32
29Here preferences are de￿ned on lotteries over outcomes and agents are assumed to be expected utility maximizers,
so typically the restrictions to domains of strict preferences in Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) or in Maskin (1999)
are not going to be satis￿ed.
30Note that in the Moore-Repullo setting (i.e., with quasi-linear utilities and arbitrary large transfers), for any
social choice function f, we have the existence of a bad outcome (i.e., an outcome which, in each state of nature, is
strictly worse for all players than any outcome in the range of the social choice function). In addition, because for
each agent, there is no most preferred outcome, f also satis￿es no-veto-power. Thus by Moore and Repullo (1990,
Corollary 3, p.1094) f is Nash implementable if and only if f is Maskin monotonic. The stochastic approximation
of f can therefore be implemented with a canonical Maskin mechanism, although since the mechanism uses integer
games it is less appealing than the simple MR mechanism.
31Renegotiation is less problematic in the case of ￿exact￿Nash implementation since renegotiation then only occurs
out of equilibrium.
32Aghion, Fehr, Holden and Wilkening (2009) conduct a laboratory experiment testing the robustness of a Moore-
Repullo mechanism to information perturbations. The experiment is meant to mimic the Hart-Moore example spelled
out in Section 2. Subjects are randomly allocated to the buyer and seller roles, and play the mechanism ten times
in a row. In one treatment there is complete information, in the other the subjects each receive a conditionally
independent private signal which is 90% accurate-generated by the subjects drawing di⁄erent colored balls from an
urn. In the complete information treatment the proportion of buyers who announce low despite having a high signal
declines from around 40% to 10% over the ten rounds. By contrast, in the incomplete information treatment buyers
continue to lie more than 40% of the time. In periods 6-10 the average number of lies in the complete information
treatment is 24%, whereas it is 42% in the incomplete information treatment.
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307 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 2
We ￿x a SCF f which is implemented under complete information by the MR mechanism ￿MR. We
let ￿ be a complete information prior and show that for the sequence of priors ￿" (indexed by " > 0)
as speci￿ed in (￿￿￿) of Section 3.2, there is no sequence of equilibrium strategy pro￿les converging to
truth-telling. Let ￿MR(￿") be an incomplete information game associated with the MR mechanism
and a prior ￿". By way of contradiction, assume that for each " > 0, there exists a pro￿le of mixed
equilibrium strategies of the game ￿MR(￿") such that as " goes to 0, the probability that both
players report their signals truthfully converges to 1. Fix such a sequence of mixed equilibrium
strategy pro￿les. We then use the following notation to describe equilibrium play in the games
￿MR(￿"):
￿ ￿
";j
k;l denotes the probability that player 1 with signal s
k;l
1 announces ￿
j
1 at Stage 1 of Phase 1;
￿ ￿
";j
k;l[^ ￿1] denotes the probability that player 2 with signal s
k;l
2 announces ￿
j
1 at Stage 2 of Phase
1 given that at Stage 1 of Phase 1, player 1 has announced ^ ￿1
￿ ￿
";j
k;l denotes the probability that player 2 with signal s
k;l
2 announces ￿
j
2 at Stage 1 of Phase 2;
and
￿ ￿
";j
k;l[^ ￿2] denotes the probability that player 1 with signal s
k;l
1 announces ￿
j
2 at Stage 2 of Phase
2 given that at Stage 1 of Phase 2, player 2 has announced ^ ￿2.
Using the above notation, our hypothesis to derive a contradiction is summarized as follows:
for all k 6= j, all l and all announcements ^ ￿1, ￿
";j
k;l and ￿
";j
k;l[^ ￿1] converge to 0 as " ! 0; and for all
l 6= j, all k and all announcement ^ ￿2, ￿
";j
k;l and ￿
";j
k;l[^ ￿2] converge to 0 as " ! 0.
We will use the following claim about the properties of the MR mechanism under complete
information:
Claim 1. For truthtelling to be the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the MR mechanism under
complete information), it must be that for each ￿ = (￿1;￿2) and each ￿1,
u1(f(￿1;￿2);￿1) > U1(y(￿1;￿1);￿1) ￿ ty(￿1;￿1) ￿ ￿; (2)
and
u2(f(￿1;￿2);￿2) > U2(x(￿1;￿1);￿2) + tx(￿1;￿1) ￿ ￿: (3)
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose ￿rst that the inequality (2) goes the other way, that is for some ￿ =
(￿1;￿2) and some ￿1, we have
u1(f(￿1;￿2);￿1) < U1(y(￿1;￿1);￿1) ￿ ty(￿1;￿1) ￿ ￿:
31Then, under complete information where the true state is ￿, we claim that truthtelling is not a
subgame-perfect equilibrium: player 1 has an incentive to deviate by claiming some ￿1 6= ￿1 (and
player 2 challenges player 1￿ s report at Stage 2 under truthtelling) in order to reach Stage 3 where he
would pick fy(￿1;￿1);ty(￿1;￿1) +￿g. This contradicts the hypothesis that truthtelling is a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the MR mechanism under complete information.
Now, suppose instead that for some ￿ = (￿1;￿2), and some ￿1 6= ￿1, we have
u1(f(￿1;￿2);￿1) = U1(y(￿1;￿1);￿1) ￿ ty(￿1;￿1) ￿ ￿:
In this case, we claim that there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium at ￿ = (￿1;￿2) where player 1
does not report truthfully. To see this, we propose the following strategy pro￿le ￿￿: At Stage 1 of
Phase 1, player 1 reports ￿1 6= ￿1; player 2 reports the true state ￿1 at Stage 2 irrespective of player
1￿ s announcement; and at Stage 3, player 1 always plays his optimal action. Note here that player
1￿ s optimal play at Stage 3 depends on what he reported at Stage 1. In Phase 2, both players always
report truthfully and player 2 plays his optimal action at stage 3. Here again, player 2￿ s optimal
action at Stage 3 depends on what he reported at Stage 1. Given the continuation strategy pro￿le
from Stage 2 induced by ￿￿, player 1 is indi⁄erent between reporting ￿1 and ￿1 at Stage 1, and so
(if truthtelling is a subgame perfect equilibrium) this ￿￿ is indeed a subgame-perfect equilibrium
at ￿ = (￿1;￿2). This contradicts the uniqueness of truthtelling as a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the MR mechanism under complete information.
Similarly, we must have that for each ￿ = (￿1;￿2) and each ￿1,
u2(f(￿1;￿2);￿2) > U2(x(￿1;￿1);￿2) + tx(￿1;￿1) ￿ ￿:
By way of contradiction, we argue why this must be the case. Suppose ￿rst that for some ￿ = (￿1;￿2)
and some ￿1, we have
u2(f(￿1;￿2);￿2) < U2(x(￿1;￿1);￿2) + tx(￿1;￿1) ￿ ￿:
Then, under complete information where the true state is ￿ = (￿1;￿2), we claim that truthtelling is
not an equilibrium: player 2 has an incentive to deviate by claiming some ￿1 6= ￿1 in order to reach
stage 3 where player 1 would pick fx(￿1;￿1);tx(￿1;￿1) + ￿g. This contradicts the hypothesis that
truthtelling is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the MR mechanism under complete information.
Now, suppose instead that for some ￿ = (￿1;￿2), and some ￿1 6= ￿1, we have
u2(f(￿1;￿2);￿2) = U2(x(￿1;￿1);￿2) + tx(￿1;￿1) ￿ ￿:
In this case, we claim that there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium at ￿ = (￿1;￿2) where player 2
does not report truthfully. To see this, we construct the following strategy pro￿le ￿￿￿: At Stage 1
of Phase 1, player 1 always reports ￿1 truthfully; player 2 reports a false state ￿1 if player 1 has
claimed ￿1 and otherwise challenges with ￿1; and at Stage 3, player 1 always plays his optimal
32action. Note here that player 1￿ s optimal play at Stage 3 depends on what he reported at Stage
1. In Phase 2, both players always report truthfully and player 2 plays his optimal action at stage
3. Here again, player 2￿ s optimal action at Stage 3 depends on what he reported at Stage 1. Since
player 1 would choose fx(￿1;￿1);tx(￿1;￿1) +￿g at Stage 3, player 2 is indi⁄erent between reporting
￿1 and ￿1 at Stage 2 after player 1 reported ￿1. This shows that (if truthtelling is a subgame
perfect equilibrium) ￿￿￿ is a subgame perfect equilibrium where player 2 does not report truthfully.
However, this contradicts the uniqueness of truthtelling as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
MR mechanism under complete information. This completes the proof of the claim.
Now, let us ￿x the prior ￿" (as de￿ned in (￿ ￿ ￿) of section 3.2.). Consider the case where
player 1 receives s
k;l
1 . Clearly, ￿"(￿k
1;￿l
2;s
k;l
2 js
k;l
1 ) ! 1 as " ! 0. Hence, at stage 1, by continuity of
expected payo⁄s with respect to beliefs, the expected equilibrium payo⁄ of player 1 for announcing
￿k
1 converges (as " vanishes) to
u1(f(￿k
1;￿l
2);￿k
1);
while if he lies by claiming ￿1 6= ￿k
1 at Stage 1, his expected equilibrium payo⁄ converges to
something (weakly) smaller than
U1(y(￿1;￿k
1);￿k
1) ￿ ty(￿1;￿k
1) ￿ ￿:
By Equation (2) and choosing " > 0 small enough, there is no way that the equilibrium strategies
f￿
";j
k;l;￿
";j
k;l[^ ￿1];￿
";j
k;l;￿
";j
k;l[^ ￿2]gk;l;j;^ ￿1;^ ￿2 can make player 1￿ s best response indi⁄erent at Stage 1. Hence,
for " > 0 small enough, player 1 with signal s
k;l
1 plays pure strategies at Stage 1 of Phase 1. This
reasoning holds for an arbitrary choice of s
k;l
1 so that player 1 plays in pure strategies irrespective
of his signal.
Note now that player 1 with signal s
k;l
1 could deviate and claim that ￿k0
1 is the true state where
k0 6= k. In this case, because player 1 plays in pure strategies (and hence, the equilibrium is fully
revealing), in the ￿rst phase, after observing ￿k0
1 , player 2 believes with probability one that player
1 has received a signal of the form s
k0;l
0
1 for some l
0
. We claim that player 2 with signal s
k;l
2 will
not challenge: indeed, by construction of ￿", player 2 with signal s
k;l
2 believes with high probability
that ￿ = (￿1;￿2) where ￿2 = ￿l
2 is the true state. If player 2 challenges with ￿k
1, by construction
of ￿", he expects player 1 to choose fx(￿k0
1 ;￿k
1);tx(￿k0
1 ;￿k
1) + ￿g at Stage 3. On the other hand, if
he does not challenge, his expected payo⁄ would tend to u2(f(￿k0
1 ;￿l
2);￿l
2) as " vanishes. Hence, by
Equation (3), for " > 0 small, player 2 will be better o⁄ by not challenging. Thus, we get that
￿
";k
k;l[￿k0
1 ] = 0, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We ￿rst introduce some notation. Given a prior ￿ over ￿ ￿ S, we write ￿(￿) for [marg￿￿](￿); and
given s￿i 2 S￿i, we will write ￿(s￿i) as [margS￿i￿](s￿i). Finally, given an arbitrary countable
space X, ￿x will denote the probability measure that puts probability 1 on fxg ￿ X.
Let ￿ be any complete information prior, and assume that a mechanism ￿ SPE-implements a
33non-Maskin monotonic SCC F. By hypothesis F is not Maskin monotonic, so there are ￿0, ￿00 and
a 2 F(￿0) satisfying (￿) in the de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity while a = 2 F(￿00). We now ￿x this
particular ￿0, ￿00 and a throughout.
Since the mechanism ￿ SPE-implements F, there exists a pure strategy subgame-perfect equi-
librium m￿
￿0 in ￿(￿0) such that g(m￿
￿0) = a. Fix one such equilibrium. Clearly, m￿
￿0 is a Nash
equilibrium of ￿(￿0). From (￿) in the de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity, it follows that m￿
￿0 is also
a Nash equilibrium of ￿(￿00). Recall that H denotes the set of all possible histories. For each t ￿ 0,
let h￿
t be the history induced by m￿
￿0 up to date t and let H￿ denote the set of all such histories for
any t. In addition, for each player i; let H￿
￿i be the set of histories h along which every player j 6= i
has chosen the message m￿
￿0;j(h) ; formally, H￿
￿i ￿ fh 2 H : h = (;;m1;m2;:::;mt￿1) for some t
and mt0
j = m
￿;t0
j;￿0 for all t0 ￿ t ￿ 1 and all j 6= ig. Note that h￿
t 2 H￿
￿i for each t ￿ 1.
Consider the following family of information structures ￿". For each player i; let ￿i represent
the pro￿le of signals s = (s1;:::;sn) de￿ned by si = s￿00
i and sj = s￿0
j for all j 6= i. For all i, ￿" is
given by33
￿"(￿0;￿i) =
"
n
￿(￿0;s￿0
);
￿"(￿0;s￿0
) = (1 ￿ ")￿(￿0;s￿0
); and
￿"(~ ￿;s
~ ￿) = ￿(~ ￿;s
~ ￿) 8~ ￿ 6= ￿0:
In this information structure when the state is anything other than ￿0 or ￿00; the state is common
knowledge. Furthermore, when a player observes s￿0
; he knows that the state is ￿0. Obviously,
￿" ! ￿ as " ! 0. The support of ￿" is denoted
supp(￿") = f(~ ￿;s
~ ￿) : ~ ￿ 2 ￿g [ f(￿0;￿i) : i 2 Ng:
Before we prove Theorem 3, we introduce some notation and the formal de￿nition of sequential
equilibrium. A system of beliefs of agent i is de￿ned as a function ￿i : Si ￿ H ! ￿(￿ ￿ S￿i). Let
￿i[(￿;s￿i) j si;ht] denote agent i￿ s belief that (￿;s￿i) is realized when agent i￿ s signal is si and the
observed history is ht. We will henceforth abuse notation and sometimes consider ￿i[(￿;s￿i) j si;ht]
as an element of ￿(￿￿S). We also say a vector of beliefs ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿n) is Bayes consistent with
a strategy pro￿le ￿ if beliefs are updated from one stage to the next using Bayes￿rule whenever
possible (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a) for its precise de￿nition). An assessment is a pair (￿;￿)
consisting of a pro￿le of beliefs and a pure behavior strategy pro￿le. We formally de￿ne sequential
equilibrium.
De￿nition 2. A sequential equilibrium is an assessment (￿;￿) that satis￿es condition (S) and (C):
33This sequence of perturbations is similar to that used by Chung and Ely (2003). However, because sequential equi-
librium requires verifying sequential rationality conditions that are not imposed by undominated Nash equilibrium,
the body of proof is very di⁄erent from that in Chung and Ely (2003).
34(S) Sequential rationality: for all i 2 N; si 2 Si;ht 2 H :
X
(￿;s￿i)2￿￿S￿i
￿i[￿;s￿ijsi;ht]
￿
ui(g(￿(s);ht);￿) ￿ ui(g((￿0
i(si);￿￿i(s￿i));ht);￿)
￿
￿ 0
for each ￿0
i.
(C) Consistency: there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategy pro￿les (￿k
1;:::;￿k
n) converging
to (￿1;:::;￿n) with Bayes consistent beliefs ￿k converging to ￿.34
Now we come back to the proof and in particular, build a sequential equilibrium (￿";￿") of
￿(￿") where g(￿"(s￿00
);;) = a for each " > 0 small enough. This will show that there exist a
sequence of priors f￿"g">0 that converges to ￿ and a corresponding sequence of sequential equilibria
f(￿";￿")g">0 such that g(￿"(s￿00
);;) ! a = 2 F(￿00) as " goes to 0. This will complete the proof.
In the sequel, we will omit the dependence of ￿" with respect to " and simply write ￿ for
￿". In the following lines, we de￿ne a strategy ￿ and a family of systems of beliefs ￿ so that
g(￿(s￿00
);;) = a. In addition, we will show that (￿;￿) is a sequential equilibrium of ￿(￿") for some
￿ 2 ￿. We de￿ne ￿ and ￿ as follows:
De￿nition of ￿:
￿1. For any player i and any ht 2 H￿ or ht = 2 H￿
￿i; ￿i(ht;s￿00
i ) = m￿
i;￿0(ht);35
￿2. For any player i, any ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿; ￿i(ht;s￿00
i ) = ￿ mi(ht) where ￿ mi satis￿es for any ht,
ht 2 H￿ or ht = 2 H￿
￿i ) ￿ mi(ht) = m￿
i;￿0(ht);
ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿ ) ￿ mi(ht) 2 argmax
X
~ ￿
￿"(~ ￿js￿00
i )ui(g((m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0);ht);~ ￿);
where the max is taken over all pure messages m0
i 2 Mi that di⁄ers from ￿ mi only at h.36 By
A1 there exists such ￿ mi;
￿3. For any player i and any ht 2 H; ￿i(ht;s￿0
i ) = m￿
i;￿0(ht);
￿4. And for any ht 2 H, ￿i(ht;s
~ ￿
i) = m￿
~ ￿;i(ht) for ~ ￿ 6= ￿0;￿00 where m￿
~ ￿0 is an arbitrary pure
strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of ￿(~ ￿). (This is well-de￿ned since F is implementable
in subgame-perfect equilibrium under complete information.)
34Convergence in the de￿nition of consistency is taken uniformly over messages and histories. Given that the set
of messages (and so the set of histories) can be countably in￿nite, two natural convergence notions can be used:
point-wise convergence or uniform convergence. The set of sequential equilibria is smaller when one assumes uniform
convergence. Hence, the use of uniform convergence strengthens our main result.
35Note that players here send the messages that m prescribes for state ￿
0 when their signal suggests that the state
is ￿
00.
36Note that the maximization above is over all pure messages m
0
i 2 Mi that di⁄ers from ￿ mi only at h: Hence,
since player i may be playing at several stages, it might be the case that this maximization depends on what player
i is playing at further histories, and these further histories may be outside H
￿
￿inH
￿ (for instance in case a player j
di⁄erent of i does not play according to m
￿
j;￿0 at some subsequent history). This is why we also have to de￿ne ￿ mi
outside H
￿
￿inH
￿.
35De￿nition of ￿:
￿ 2 ￿ if and only ￿ satis￿es the following three properties.
￿1. Fix any i 2 N, any ht = 2 H￿
￿i,
￿i
h
￿
￿ ￿s￿00
i ;ht
i
= ￿(￿0;s￿0
￿i)
and
supp
￿
￿i
h
￿
￿
￿s￿0
i ;ht
i￿
￿ supp
￿
￿"
h
￿
￿
￿s￿0
i
i￿
and for all l 6= i with ht 2 H￿
￿lnH￿
￿i
(i.e., player l has deviated from the path prescibed by m￿
￿0)
￿i[(￿0;￿l) j s￿0
i ;ht] = 0.
￿2. For any i 2 N, any ht 2 H￿
￿i, any si 2 fs￿0
i ;s￿00
i g;
￿i[￿jsi;ht] = ￿"(￿jsi):
￿3. For any i 2 N, any ht 2 H and any s
~ ￿
i = 2 fs￿0
i ;s￿00
i g, ￿i
h
￿
￿
￿s
~ ￿
i;ht
i
= ￿(~ ￿;s
~ ￿
￿i) where ￿x denotes
the probability measure that puts probability 1 on fxg.
Note that hT[￿(s￿00
);;] = hT[m￿
￿0;;] and so, ￿ generates g(￿(s￿00
);;) = g(m￿
￿0;;) = a. Hence,
it only remains to show that (￿;￿) constitutes a sequential equilibrium for some ￿ 2 ￿. In Sec-
tion 7.2.1, we show that (￿;￿) satis￿es sequential rationality for any ￿ 2 ￿; and we establish that
(￿;￿) satis￿es consistency for some ￿ 2 ￿ in Section 7.2.2.
7.2.1 Sequential rationality
Fix any ￿ 2 ￿. Sequential rationality of (￿;￿) will be proved by Claims 2 and 3 below.
Claim 2. For any i 2 N; si 6= s￿00
i ;ht 2 H :
X
(~ ￿;s￿i)
￿i[(~ ￿;s￿i)jsi;ht]
h
ui(g(￿(s);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(si);￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0
for each ￿0
i.
This claim 2 states that for any player i with any signal si 6= s￿00
i , ￿i is a best response to
￿￿i given his belief ￿i. This will be checked by considering three classes of histories: (1) Histories
where all players have played according to the equilibrium m￿
￿0 (i.e., in H￿); (2) histories where
player i has not played according to m￿
i;￿0 but all other players have (i.e., in H￿
￿inH￿); and ￿nally
(3) histories where some player other than i has not played according to m￿
￿0 (i.e., outside H￿
￿i).
In particular, in the non-trivial case where si = s￿0
i , we will show that for any of these histories
ht; whenever player i follows ￿i against ￿￿i, player i believes with probability one that the outcome
36will be given by g(m￿
￿0;ht); while if player i deviates from ￿i(si) to some m0
i , player i believes
with probability one that the outcome will be given by g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht). Because m￿
￿0 is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium in the complete information game ￿(￿0) and player i with signal s￿0
i believes
with probability one that ￿0 is the true state, this will prove the claim.
Proof of Claim 2. Fix any player i. Claim 1 is obvious for s
~ ￿
i 6= s￿0
i because by ￿3, ￿i
h
￿
￿ ￿s
~ ￿
i;ht
i
=
￿(~ ￿;s
~ ￿
￿i) and so state ~ ￿ is common knowledge. By ￿4, we can further conclude that ￿(s
~ ￿) = m￿
~ ￿ is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium in the complete information game ￿(~ ￿). Hence, we focus on the case
where si = s￿0
i . By construction, ￿"(￿0js￿0
i ) = 1 and so this player knows the state is ￿0; and he
knows the pro￿le of signals is either s￿0
or ￿k for some k 6= i. We partition the set of all histories
into three classes H￿; H￿
￿inH￿ and HnH￿
￿i and consider the following three cases: Case (1) ht 2 H￿;
Case (2) ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿; and Case (3) ht = 2 H￿
￿i.
￿ Case (1): ht 2 H￿
In this case, each player has played according to m￿
￿0 and if players j 6= i received signals of
either s￿0
j or s￿00
j , by ￿1 and ￿3, this will continue to be the case as long as all players conform
to ￿. So when players are playing strategy ￿, and the pro￿le of signals received is s￿0
or ￿k, for
k 6= i any subsequent history also falls into H￿. Thus, g(￿(s￿0
);ht) = g(￿(￿k);ht) = g(m￿
￿0;ht):
Now suppose player i deviates to a strategy ￿0
i so that ￿0
i(s￿0
i ) = m0
i. Clearly, since m0
i 6=
￿i(s￿0
i ), there is a date at which player i does not play according to m￿
i;￿0. Thus, by ￿1 and
￿3, when the pro￿le of signals received is either s￿0
or ￿k for k 6= i, any subsequent history of
ht either falls in H￿ (player i has played according to m￿
i;￿0 so far) or does not fall in H￿
￿k for
each k 6= i (at some point in this history, player i has not played according to m￿
i;￿0). In each
of these cases, again by ￿1 and ￿3, player i￿ s opponents are playing according to m￿
￿i;￿0. So
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g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht) = g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(￿k);ht) = g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht):
Here again, since m￿
￿0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the complete information game
￿(￿0), we have
ui(g(m￿
￿0;ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht);￿0):
Thus, we get ui(g(￿(s￿0
);ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht);￿0) and ui(g(￿(￿k);ht);￿0) ￿
ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(￿k);ht);￿0) for each k 6= i. Now since by ￿2, ￿i[￿ j s￿0
i ;ht] may assign strictly
positive weight only to (￿0;s￿0
￿i) and (￿0;￿k) for each k 6= i, we can conclude
X
(~ ￿;s￿i)
￿i[(~ ￿;s￿i)js￿0
i ;ht]
h
ui(g(￿i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0.
￿ Case (2): ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿
37We abuse notation because we should use ￿￿i(￿lns
￿0
i ) instead of ￿￿i(￿l).
37Since ht 2 H￿
￿i and ht = 2 H￿, only player i has not played according to m￿
i;￿0. Then, it is
clear that ht does not fall in H￿
￿k for each k 6= i (recall that H￿
￿k is the set of histories under
which every player j other than k has played according to m￿
j;￿0). It is also clear that any
subsequent history does not fall in H￿
￿k for each k 6= i. By ￿1 and ￿3, we thus obtain
that each player k other than i will play according to m￿
k;￿0 at any subsequent history when
receiving signal s￿0
k or s￿00
k . Hence,
g(￿(s￿0
);ht) = g(￿(￿k);ht) = g(m￿
￿0;ht):
Consider the case where player i deviates to a strategy ￿0
i so that ￿0
i(s￿0
i ) = m0
i. Here, since
(by a similar argument as above) any history that player i can achieve by deviating does not
fall in H￿
￿k for each k 6= i, each player k other than i will be playing according to m￿
k;￿0 at
any subsequent history whether he receive s￿0
k or s￿00
k , which implies
g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht) = g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(￿k);ht) = g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht):
Since m￿
￿0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the complete information game ￿(￿0), we already
have ui(g(m￿
￿0;ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht);￿0). Thus, we also get
ui(g(￿(s￿0
);ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht);￿0) and
ui(g(￿(￿k);ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(￿k);ht);￿0) for each k 6= i:
Now, since by ￿2 we know that ￿i[￿js￿0
i ;ht] assigns a strictly positive weight only to (￿0;s￿0
￿i)
and (￿0;￿k) for each k 6= i, we can conclude
X
(~ ￿;s￿i)
￿i[(~ ￿;s￿i)js￿0
i ;ht]
h
ui(g(￿(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0:
￿ Case (3): ht = 2 H￿
￿i
In this case, at least one player j 6= i has not played according to m￿
j;￿0.
By ￿3, we know that when each player j receives signal s￿0
j , then these players play according
to m￿
j;￿0, so ￿(s￿0
) = m￿
￿0. Thus, at history ht, the outcome achieved by playing ￿ when the
pro￿le of signals is s￿0
must be the same as the one when playing m￿
￿0, i.e.,
g(￿(s￿0
);ht) = g(m￿
￿0;ht):
In addition, for each l 6= i with ht = 2 H￿
￿l; by de￿nition, some player j other than l has not
played according to m￿
j;￿0 and obviously this will continue to be the case at any subsequent
histories. Hence, any subsequent histories does not belong to H￿
￿l either. At any such
histories, we know by ￿1, that player l will be playing according to m￿
l;￿0 when he receives s￿00
l
while when players j other than l receive signal s￿0
j , by ￿3 they will also be playing according
38to m￿
j;￿0. Hence, we get that the outcome achieved from history ht when playing ￿ and when
the pro￿le of signals received is ￿l is equal to the outcome achieved from history ht when
playing m￿
￿0. Otherwise stated, for each l 6= i with ht = 2 H￿
￿l; we have
g(￿(￿l);ht) = g(m￿
￿0;ht).
Now, when player i deviates say to a strategy ￿0
i so that ￿0
i(s￿0
i ) = m0
i, using the argument
above, when the other players receive signal pro￿le s￿0
￿i, we know that the outcome achieved
is
g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht) = g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht):
while for each l 6= i with ht = 2 H￿
￿l; we know that
g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(￿l);ht) = g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht):
Since m￿
￿0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the complete information game ￿(￿0), we have
ui(g(m￿
￿0;ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht);￿0). Thus, we get
ui(g(￿(s￿0
);ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht);￿0)
and for each l 6= i such that ht = 2 H￿
￿l; ui(g(￿(￿l);ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(￿l);ht);￿0).
Because by ￿1, ￿i[￿js￿0
i ;ht] may assign strictly positive weight only to (￿0;s￿0
￿i) and (￿0;￿l) for
each l 6= i such that ht = 2 H￿
￿l, we can conclude
X
(~ ￿;s￿i)
￿i[(~ ￿;s￿i)js￿0
i ;ht]
h
ui(g(￿(s￿0
i ;s￿i);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿0
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0.
This completes the proof of that claim.
Claim 3. For any i 2 N; si = s￿00
i , and ht 2 H :
X
(~ ￿;s￿i)
￿i[(~ ￿;s￿i)jsi;ht]
h
ui(g(￿(s);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(si);￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0
for each ￿0
i:
This claim 3 states that for any player i with signal s￿00
i , ￿i is a best response to ￿￿i given his
belief ￿i. Here again we consider the same partition of histories as in Claim 2. When ht is a history
where each player has played according to m￿
￿0 (i.e., ht 2 H￿), player i assigns positive probability
to both ￿00 and ￿0. However, we will show that here again player i believes with probability one
that the other players will be playing according to m￿
￿i;￿0; whether he deviates or not. Hence, if he
does not deviate and ht 2 H￿, he gets a while if he deviates to m0
i he gets g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht). Because
39m￿
￿0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in ￿(￿0), we know that the deviation is not pro￿table if ￿0 is
the true state, and Maskin monotonicity (condition (￿)) implies that this is also not pro￿table if
the state is ￿00: Since these are the only states to which player i assigns strictly positive probability,
this will complete the argument for this class of histories.
The easy case occurs when ht is a history where a player other than i has not played according
to m￿
￿0 (i.e., ht = 2 H￿
￿i). In such a case, player i believes with probability one that ￿0 is the true
state. In addition we will check that whenever player i uses ￿i against ￿￿i, player i believes with
probability one that the outcome will be given by g(m￿
￿0;ht), while if player i deviates from ￿i(si) to
m0
i, player i believes with probability one that the outcome will be given by g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht). Here
again, the fact that m￿
￿0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the complete information game will lead
to the desired result. Finally, in the last case where player i has not played according to m￿
￿0 while
all other players have (i.e., ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿), we will also check that player i assigns probability one
to his opponent playing m￿
￿i;￿0. But ￿i has been constructed (see ￿2) so that playing ￿i is better
than any one-shot deviation. Then the one-shot deviation principle for sequential equilibrium will
complete the proof of Claim 3. Taken together, Claims 2 and 3 establish sequential rationality of
(￿;￿):
Proof of Claim 3. This claim will be proved by studying three di⁄erent cases depending on the
type of history we consider: (1) ht 2 H￿; (2) ht = 2 H￿
￿i; and (3) ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿.
￿ Case (1): ht 2 H￿
In this case, each player has played according to m￿
￿0. Note that, by ￿1 and ￿3, if each player
j received signals of either s￿0
j or s￿00
j , this will continue to be the case as long as all players
conform to ￿. So when players are playing strategy ￿, and player i0s opponents received
either signal pro￿le s￿0
￿i or s￿00
￿i, any subsequent history also falls into H￿. Thus,
g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿00
￿i);ht) = g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿0
￿i);ht) = g(m￿
￿0;ht):
Now suppose that player i deviates to a strategy ￿0
i so that ￿0
i(s￿00
i ) = m0
i. Since m0
i 6= ￿i(s￿00
i ),
there must exist a date at which player i does not play according to m￿
i;￿0: Thus, by ￿1 and
￿3, when player i￿ s opponents receive signal s￿0
￿i or s￿00
￿i, any subsequent history of ht either
falls in H￿ (player i has played according to m￿
i;￿0 so far) or does not fall in H￿
￿k for each k 6= i
(at some point in this history, player i has not played according to m￿
i;￿0). In each of these
cases, by ￿1 and ￿3, player i￿ s opponents are playing according to m￿
￿i;￿0. So we get
g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht) = g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿00
￿i);ht) = g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht): (4)
Here again, since m￿
￿0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the complete information game
￿(￿0), we have
ui(g(m￿
￿0;ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht);￿0):
40Thus, we also get
ui(g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿0
￿i);ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht);￿0): (5)
The above inequality, together with (4), also implies
ui(g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿00
￿i);ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿00
￿i);ht);￿0):
Since g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿00
￿i);ht) = g(m￿
￿0;h￿
t) = a and we have assumed that ￿0 and ￿00 are two states
satisfying (￿) in the de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity, we get that
ui(g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿00
￿i);ht);￿00) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿00
￿i);ht);￿00): (6)
Now, since by ￿2, ￿i[￿js￿00
i ;ht] assigns a strictly positive weight only to (￿0;s￿0
￿i) and (￿00;s￿00
￿i),
we conclude (5) and (6) imply that:
X
(~ ￿;s￿i))
￿i[(~ ￿;s￿i)js￿00
i ;ht]
h
ui(g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿i);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0.
￿ Case (2): ht = 2 H￿
￿i
In this case, at least one player j 6= i has not played according to m￿
j;￿0; This is still the
case for any subsequent histories, so that they all fall outside H￿
￿i. By ￿1, if player i plays
according to ￿i, from ht, he will play according to m￿
i;￿0. Now, by ￿3, we know that when
player j other than i receives signal s￿0
j ; then he plays according to m￿
j;￿0. Thus, the outcome
achieved when the pro￿le of signals is (s￿00
i ;s￿0
￿i) must be the same as the outcome achieved
when m￿
￿0 is played. That is, we obtain
g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿0
￿i);ht) = g(m￿
￿0;ht):
Suppose player i deviates to a strategy ￿0
i so that ￿0
i(s￿00
i ) = m0
i. Since, if the other players
are receiving signal pro￿le s￿0
￿i, they will all be playing according to m￿
￿i;￿0, we obtain
g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht) = g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht):
Since m￿
￿0 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the complete information game ￿(￿0), we have
ui(g(m￿
￿0;ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿0;ht);￿0). Thus, we also get
ui(g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿0
￿i);ht);￿0) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿0
￿i);ht);￿0):
41Because by ￿1, ￿i[(￿0;s￿0
￿i)js￿00
i ;ht] = 1; so we can conclude
X
(~ ￿;s￿i)
￿i[(~ ￿;s￿i)js￿00
i ;ht]
h
ui(g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿i);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0.
￿ Case (3): ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿
Since ht 2 H￿
￿i and ht = 2 H￿, only player i has not played according to m￿
i;￿0. Then ht does not
fall in H￿
￿k for each k 6= i (recall that H￿
￿k is the set of histories under which every player j
other than k has played according to m￿
j;￿0). It is also clear that any subsequent history does
not fall in H￿
￿k for each k 6= i. By ￿1 and ￿3, whether player i￿ s opponents have received
s￿0
￿i or s￿00
￿i, they all play according to m￿
￿i;￿0. By ￿2 we know that ￿i[￿js￿00
i ;ht] = ￿"(￿js￿00
i )
assigns a strictly positive weight only to (￿0;s￿0
￿i) and (￿00;s￿00
￿i). In addition, we have that for
any h 2 H￿ or h = 2 H￿
￿i : ￿i(h;s￿00
i ) = m￿
i;￿0(h;s￿00
i ). Since ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿, we conclude with ￿2
that:
X
(~ ￿;s￿i)
￿"(~ ￿;s￿ijs￿
00
i )
h
ui(g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿i);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0
for any ￿
0
i that di⁄ers from ￿i only at ht. By this and case (1) and (2), we know that at any
history players have no pro￿table one-shot deviation, by the one-shot deviation principle (see
Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996)38) this yields:
X
(~ ￿;s￿i)
￿"(~ ￿;s￿ijs￿
00
i )
h
ui(g(￿(s￿00
i ;s￿i);ht);~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿0
i(s￿00
i );￿￿i(s￿i);ht);~ ￿)
i
￿ 0
for any ￿0
i. This completes the proof.
7.2.2 Consistency
In this section, we show that for some ￿ 2 ￿, (￿;￿) satis￿es consistency.
To show this part, we ￿rst ￿x ￿ as de￿ned above and consider the following sequence f(￿k;￿k)g1
k=0
of assessments. Let ￿k > 0 for each k and ￿k ! 0 as k ! 1. For each player i; ht 2 H, and signal
si, let ￿i(ht;si;￿) be any strictly positive prior over Mi(ht)nf￿i(si;ht)g and de￿ne ￿k
i as
￿k
i (mt
ijht;s￿00
i ) =
(
1 ￿ ￿T￿n
k if mt
i = ￿i(ht;s￿00
i );
￿T￿n
k ￿ ￿i(ht;s￿00
i ;mt
i) otherwise
38Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996) assume that for each i and h, Mi(h) is ￿nite, which is our A1. It is easy to
check that their argument goes through in case Mi(h) is countably in￿nite. This fact is implicitly used in Section
7.3.
42where T is the (￿nite) length of the longest ￿nal history, and for any signal si 6= s￿00
i :
￿k
i (mt
ijht;si) =
(
1 ￿ ￿k if mt
i = ￿i(ht;si);
￿k ￿ ￿i(ht;si;mt
i) otherwise
.
Let ￿k be the unique consistent belief associated with each ￿k. It is easy to check that ￿k converges
to ￿ and also that ￿k converges.39 Let ￿ ￿ limk!1 ￿k. In what follows, we show that ￿ satis￿es
￿1, ￿2 and ￿3. This will show that (￿;￿) satis￿es consistency, and ￿ 2 ￿ as claimed.
To do so, we explicitly compute each ￿k and study its limit as k tends to in￿nity. In general
for each (~ ￿; ~ s￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ S￿i; each ht = (m1;:::;mt￿1) 2 H, and each ~ si 2 Si, we have
￿k
i [(~ ￿; ~ s￿i)j~ si;ht] =
￿"(~ ￿; ~ s￿i; ~ si) ￿
Qt￿1
t0=1
h
￿k(mt0
jht0; ~ s)
i
P
(^ ￿;s0
￿i)
￿"(^ ￿;s0
￿i; ~ si) ￿
Qt￿1
t0=1
￿
￿k(mt0jht0;s0
￿i; ~ si)
￿.
In the above formula for each t0 ￿ t, ht0 stands for the truncation of ht to the ￿rst t0 elements, i.e.,
ht0 = (m1;:::;mt0￿1).
Claim 4. ￿ satis￿es ￿1.
Claim 4 says that, for any player i who sees signal s￿00
i and has an opportunity to play after some
other player has not played according to m￿
￿0 (i.e., ht = 2 H￿
￿i), then under ￿ ￿ limk!1 ￿k, player i
believes with probability one that the state is ￿0; and that the other players have received s￿0
￿i. In
order to show that, we observe that if every player other than i has received a signal sj 2 fs￿0
j ;s￿00
j g;
then at such a history some player j other than i has deviated from ￿. Then, since under the
sequence of totally mixed strategies built above, it is (in￿nitely) more likely (as ￿k tends to 0) that
a deviation occurred at s￿0
j rather than at s￿00
j . In the limit, Bayes￿rule will then put probability
one on s￿0
j and given that the prior ￿" assigns strictly positive weight only to (￿00;s￿00
￿i) and (￿0;s￿0
￿i),
Bayes rule will then put probability arbitrarily close to one on (￿0;s￿0
￿i). In case player i received
the private signal s￿0
i , if ht is a history under which all players other than l have played according
to m￿
￿0 (i.e. ht 2 H￿
￿l), then the deviating player is l and again using a similar argument as above,
we show that player i must assign probability 0 to player l receiving s￿00
l and so to ￿l.
Consider player i at history ht = 2 H￿
￿i. The proof is reduced to checking the following two cases:
Proof of Claim 4. Case 1: si = s￿00
i
39As will become clear from the proof, the sequence f￿
kgk does converge. Moreover, convergence in the de￿nition
of consistency is taken uniformly over messages and histories. In the case where Mi(h) is countably in￿nite (we will
discuss this case in Section 7.3 in the Appendix), two natural convergence notions can be used: point-wise convergence
or uniform convergence. The set of sequential equilibria is smaller when one assumes uniform convergence. Hence,
the use of uniform convergence strengthens our result.
43Recall that ￿"(￿;s￿00
i ) assigns a strictly positive weight only to (￿00;s￿00
￿i) and (￿0;s￿0
￿i). Hence,
￿k
i [(￿0;s￿0
￿i)js￿00
i ;ht]
=
￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿00
i ) ￿
Q
j6=i
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿00
i ) ￿
Q
j6=i
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j ) + ￿"(￿00;s￿00
￿i;s￿00
i ) ￿
Q
j6=i
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j )
=
￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿00
i )
￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿00
i ) + ￿"(￿00;s￿00
￿i;s￿00
i ) ￿
Q
j6=i
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j )
Q
j6=i
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
:
We now show that the ratio below converges to 0 as k ! 1:
Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j )
￿Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j ) ! 0 as k ! 1:
This will show that ￿k
i [(￿0;s￿0
￿i)js￿00
i ;ht] ! 1 and ￿k
i [(￿00;s￿00
￿i)js￿00
i ;ht] ! 0 as k ! 1.
Note ￿rst that in case every player j other than i receives signal sj 2 fs￿0
j ;s￿00
j g, there must exist
a player ^ | 6= i and a date ^ t ￿ t ￿ 1 so that ^ | has not played according to ￿^ |; i.e. ￿^ |(h^ t;s^ |) 6= m
^ t
^ |.
To see this, we proceed by contradiction and assume that ￿￿i(ht0;s￿i) = mt0
￿i for all t0 ￿ t ￿ 1.
This implies that whenever ht0￿1 2 H￿
￿i, we must have ht0 2 H￿
￿i; because ht0￿1 2 H￿
￿i implies
that either ht0￿1 2 H￿ (i.e., no player has deviated) or ht0￿1 = 2 H￿
￿j for all j 6= i (i.e., player i has
deviated). In either case, ￿￿i(ht0￿1;s￿i) = m￿
￿i;￿0(ht0￿1) is obtained by ￿1 and ￿3. Since we have
assumed that ￿￿i(ht0￿1;s￿i) = mt0￿1
￿i , we get mt0￿1
￿i = m￿
￿i;￿0(ht0￿1), which proves that ht0 2 H￿
￿i.
Since h1 = ; 2 H￿ ￿ H￿
￿i, this simple inductive argument shows that ht 2 H￿
￿i; a contradiction.
By construction of ￿k, this implies that for some ^ | 6= i and ^ t ￿ t ￿ 1 :
￿k
^ |(m
^ t
^ |jh^ t;s￿00
^ | ) = ￿T￿n
k ￿^ |(h^ t;s￿00
^ | ;m
^ t
^ |). (7)
Now, we have:
Q
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j )
Q
j6=i
Qt￿1
t0=1 ￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
￿
￿T￿n
k ￿ ￿^ |(h^ t;s￿00
^ | ;m
^ t
^ |) ￿ 1
Q
j6=i
Qt￿1
t0=1 ￿k￿j(ht0;s￿0
j ;mt0
j )
=
￿T￿n
k
￿
(t￿1)(n￿1)
k
￿
￿^ |(h^ t;s￿00
^ | ;m
^ t
^ |)
Q
j6=i
Qt￿1
t0=1 ￿j(ht0;s￿0
j ;mt0
j )
! 0 (as k ! 1):
Here, the inequality is assured by (7) and the construction of ￿k that, for all j and t0 ￿ t ￿ 1,
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j ) ￿ ￿k ￿ ￿j(ht0;s￿0
j ;mt0
j ).
44Case 2: si = s￿0
i
Recall that ￿"(￿;s￿0
i ) assigns a strictly positive weight only to (￿0;s￿0
￿i) and (￿0;￿l) for each l 6= i.
Hence,
￿k
i [(￿0;￿l)js￿0
i ;ht]
=
￿"(￿0;￿l) ￿
Q
j6=l;i
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j ) ￿
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l )
P
z6=i
￿"(￿0;￿z) ￿
Q
j6=z;i
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j ) + ￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿0
i ) ￿
Q
j6=i
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
=
￿"(￿0;￿l)
P
z6=i
￿"(￿0;￿z) ￿ cz(k) + ￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿0
i ) ￿
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿0
l )
. t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l )
for some positive functions cz(k). We now show that if ht 2 H￿
￿l, then the ratio below converges
to +1 as k ! 1:
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿0
l )
,
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l ) ! +1 as k ! 1:
This will show that ￿k
i [(￿0;￿l)js￿0
i ;ht] ! 0 for all l if ht 2 H￿
￿l; and hence that ￿ satis￿es ￿1.
Assume that ht 2 H￿
￿l for some l, as we already claimed, if every player j other than i has received
a signal sj 2 fs￿0
j ;s￿00
j g, there is a player ^ | 6= i and a date ^ t ￿ t￿1 so that ^ | has not played according
to ￿^ |, i.e., ￿^ |(h^ t;s^ |) 6= m
^ t
^ |. Now, since ht 2 H￿
￿l, we claim that ^ | = l. Indeed, ht 2 H￿
￿l means that
any player j other than l has played according to m￿
j;￿0. So if player l had played according to ￿l
(i.e., for all t0 : ￿l(ht0;sl) = mt0
l ), repeated applications of ￿1 and ￿3 would yield to ht = h￿
t 2 H￿
￿i
which is false by assumption.
By construction of ￿k, this implies that there exists ^ t ￿ t ￿ 1 such that ￿l(h^ t;sl) 6= m
^ t
l and so:
￿k
l (m
^ t
ljh^ t;s￿00
l ) = ￿T￿n
k ￿l(h^ t;s￿00
l ;m
^ t
l). (8)
Now, we have
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿0
l )
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l )
￿
￿t￿1
k
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿l(ht0;s￿0
l ;mt0
l )
￿T￿n
k ￿l(h^ t;s￿00
l ;m
^ t
l) ￿ 1
! 1 (as k ! 1).
Where the inequality is assured by (8) and (assuming without loss of generality that ￿k is small)
we use the fact that by construction, for all t0 ￿ t ￿ 1, ￿k
l (mt0
j jht0;s￿0
l ) ￿ ￿k ￿ ￿l(ht0;s￿0
l ;mt0
l ).
Claim 5. ￿ satis￿es ￿2.
45Claim 5 says that if a player i gets signal s￿0
i or s￿00
i then at a history ht under which each of his
opponent has played according to m￿
￿0, ￿ is the same as his beliefs given only by his private signal.
To prove this, we show that if every player j 6= i has received a signal sj 2 fs￿0
j ;s￿00
j g then at
histories where all players other than i have played according to m￿
￿0; each player other than i has
played according to ￿ at each previous stage. This ensures that for any ht 2 H￿
￿i, no player other
than i has deviated from the candidate for sequential equilibrium strategy ￿ and so player i￿ s beliefs
must be given by his private signal.
Proof of Claim 5. Consider player i at history ht 2 H￿
￿i. Here again, the proof is reduced to
checking the following two cases.
Case 1: si = s￿00
i
Recall that ￿"(￿;s￿00
i ) assigns a strictly positive weight only to (￿00;s￿00
￿i) and (￿0;s￿0
￿i). Hence,
￿k
i [(￿00;s￿00
￿i)js￿00
i ;ht]
=
￿"(￿00;s￿00
￿i;s￿00
i ) ￿
Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j )
￿"(￿00;s￿00
) ￿
Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j ) + ￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿00
i ) ￿
Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
=
￿"(￿00;s￿00
￿i;s￿00
i )
￿"(￿00;s￿00) + ￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿
00
i ) ￿
Y
j6=i
Qt￿1
t0=1 ￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
Y
j6=i
Qt￿1
t0=1 ￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j )
We now show that the ratio below converges to 1 as k ! 1:
Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
￿Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j ) ! 1 as k ! 1:
This will show that ￿k
i [(￿00;s￿00
￿i)js￿00
i ;ht] ! ￿"((￿00;s￿00
￿i)js￿00
i ) and ￿k
i [(￿0;s￿0
￿i)js￿00
i ;ht] ! ￿"((￿0;s￿0
￿i)js￿00
i ).
Note now that if players j 6= i receive signal sj 2 fs￿0
j ;s￿00
j g, then for all t0 ￿ t ￿ 1, ￿j(ht0;sj) =
mt0
j . To see this, note that for any t0 ￿ t ￿ 1 : ht0 2 H￿
￿i, thus, either every player has played
according to m￿
￿0 (i.e., ht0 2 H￿) or player i has not played according to m￿
i;￿0 (i.e., ht0 = 2 H￿
￿j for
all j 6= i). In each of these cases we know, by ￿1 and ￿3, that ￿j presribes to play according to
m￿
j;￿0. Since ht0 2 H￿
￿i this implies that ￿j(ht0;sj) = m￿
j;￿0(ht0) = mt0
j .
By construction of ￿k, this in turn implies that for all j 6= i and t0 ￿ t ￿ 1 :
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j ) = 1 ￿ ￿k and ￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j ) = 1 ￿ ￿T￿n
k :
46Thus,
Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
￿Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿00
j ) ! 1 as k ! 1:
Case 2: si = s￿0
i
Recall that ￿"(￿;s￿0
i ) assigns a strictly positive weight only to (￿0;s￿0
￿i) and (￿0;￿l) for l 6= i.
Hence,
￿k
i [(￿0;s￿0
￿i)js￿0
i ;ht]
=
￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿0
i ) ￿
Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j )
￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿0
i ) ￿
Y
j6=i
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j ) +
P
l6=i
￿"(￿0;￿l) ￿
Y
j6=i;l
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
j(mt0
j jht0;s￿0
j ) ￿
t￿1 Q
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l )
=
￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿0
i )
￿"(￿0;s￿0
￿i;s￿0
i ) +
P
l6=i
￿"(￿0;￿l) ￿
Qt￿1
t0=1 ￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l )
Qt￿1
t0=1 ￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿0
l )
We now show that for each l 6= i, the ratio below converges to 1 as k ! 1:
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l )
￿ t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿0
l ) ! 1 as k ! 1:
This will show that ￿k
i [(￿0;s￿0
￿i)js￿0
i ;ht] ! ￿"((￿0;s￿0
￿i)js￿0
i ) and similar reasoning shows that for each
l 6= i : ￿k
i [(￿0;￿l)js￿0
i ;ht] ! ￿"((￿0;￿l)js￿0
i ), and hence, ￿ satis￿es ￿2.
Now, by similar reasoning as in the case above, we get that for all l 6= i and t0 ￿ t ￿ 1 :
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿0
l ) = 1 ￿ ￿k and ￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l ) = 1 ￿ ￿T￿n
k :
Thus,
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿00
l )
,
t￿1 Y
t0=1
￿k
l (mt0
l jht0;s￿0
l ) ! 1 as k ! 1:
Finally, observing that for s
~ ￿
i = 2 fs￿0
i ;s￿00
i g, ￿"(￿;s
~ ￿
i) assigns a weight one to (~ ￿;s
~ ￿
￿i), we have
established the following claim, which completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Claim 6. ￿ satis￿es ￿3.
7.3 Theorem 3 extends to countable messages
Here we extend Theorem 3 to mechanisms that have countably in￿nite message spaces. This ex-
tension is important because some of the literature on implementation theory uses ￿integer games￿
where each player has to announce an integer and becomes the dictator when his integer is the
47largest one, as in Maskin (1999) and in Moore and Repullo (1988).
Assumption A2. Mi (h) is countable for each i and h:
The next assumption says that against any pro￿le of strategy in the complete information game,
in the neighborhood of complete information, each player i has a non-empty set of best responses.
This condition is vacuously satis￿ed under A1, so Theorems 3 and 4 show that if a mechanism
can implement a non-Maskin monotonic social choice correspondence (SCC) both under complete
information and under small information perturbations, then under this mechanism players must
not have well-de￿ned best responses. In addition, we show in the supplemental materials that when
the state space is ￿nite (this is our case), Moore and Repullo￿ s general mechanism has well-de￿ned
best-responses (under weak assumptions) and so our argument also applies there.
Assumption A3. The sequential mechanism ￿ has well-de￿ned best replies: for any player i;
any ￿ 2 ￿; any m￿i 2 M￿i; there exists ￿ ￿ (i;￿;m￿i) > 0 such that for any ￿ 2 ￿(￿) with
￿ (￿) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ (i;￿;m￿i); for any mi 2 Mi we have for all h 2 H :
argmax
X
~ ￿
￿(~ ￿)ui(g
￿￿
m0
i;m￿i)
￿
;h
￿
;~ ￿) 6= ;
where the max is taken over all pure messages m0
i 2 Mi that di⁄er from mi only at h:
Remark 1. If the mechanism is not ￿nite but the set of outcomes is, A3 is also vacuously satis￿ed.
We also note that A3 is not needed for sequential mechanisms in which each player moves only
once.40
Theorem 4. Assume A2 and A3. Suppose that a mechanism ￿ SPE-implements a non-Maskin
monotonic SCC F. Fix any complete information prior ￿. There exist a sequence of priors f￿"g">0
that converges to ￿ and a corresponding sequence of sequential equilibria f(￿";￿")g">0 such that as
" tends to 0, g(￿"(s￿);;) ! a = 2 F(￿) for some ￿ 2 ￿ and some a 2 A.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3 where we only consider ￿nite
mechanisms. So, we claim that there are essentially only two changes we need to extend the proof
of Theorem 3 to the case of countably in￿nite message spaces. First, in the beginning of the proof
of Theorem 3, we have to choose " > 0 small enough to apply A3. Second, we will show that A3
guarantees that ￿2 (which is introduced in the proof of Theorem 3) is well de￿ned. This will be
proved in the next subsection.
7.3.1 A3 guarantees that ￿2 is well-de￿ned
Fix " > 0 small enough so that ￿"(￿
0
js￿
0
i ) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿(i;￿;m￿
￿i;￿). We shall claim that A3 guarantees
that one can construct ￿ mi needed for ￿2. First, for any ht 2 H￿ or ht = 2 H￿
￿i; we set ￿ mi(ht) =
40One can directly check this in the de￿nition of strategy ￿ (￿2) used in the proof of Theorem 3. More speci￿cally,
it can be checked there that for each player, A3 is only used at histories where this player has to choose a message
and at which he has previously deviated from the equilibrium. By construction, there is no such a history.
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i;￿(ht). Second, we de￿ne ￿ mi by induction on the set of histories in H￿
￿inH￿. Take any history
ht 2 H￿
￿inH￿ so that there is no subsequent history that falls into H￿
￿inH￿. Since we already
de￿ned ￿ mi(ht) = m￿
i;￿(ht) for any ht = 2 H￿
￿inH￿, ￿ mi has been de￿ned for any subsequent histories.
By A3 we obtain
argmax
X
~ ￿
￿"(~ ￿js￿
0
i )ui(g
￿￿
m0
i;m￿
￿i;￿)
￿
;ht
￿
;~ ￿) 6= ;
where the max is taken over all pure messages m0
i 2 Mi that di⁄er from ￿ mi only at ht and are
identical at any subsequent histories (what happens before ht is obviously irrelevant).
Now set
￿ mi(ht) 2 argmax
X
~ ￿
￿"(~ ￿js￿
0
i )ui(g
￿￿
m0
i;m￿i)
￿
;ht
￿
;~ ￿):
This establishes that one can inductively construct ￿ mi so that ￿ mi satis￿es the properties needed
for ￿2.
7.3.2 A3 is satis￿ed in the Moore-Repullo canonical mechanism
We will review some of the main results of Moore and Repullo (1988) here.
De￿nition 3 (Moore and Repullo (1988)). A social choice correspondence F satis￿es Condition
C if, for every pair of pro￿les ￿;￿ 2 ￿ with a 2 F(￿)nF(￿), there exists a ￿nite sequence
￿(￿;￿;a) ￿ fa0 = a;a1;:::;ak;:::;al;al+1g ￿ A;
with l = l(￿;￿;a) ￿ 1, such that:
1. for each k = 0;:::;l ￿ 1, there is some particular player j(k) = j(kj￿;￿;a), for whom
uj(k)(ak;￿) ￿ uj(k)(ak+1;￿);
2. there is some player j(l) = j(lj￿;￿;a) for whom
uj(l)(al;￿) ￿ uj(l)(al+1;￿) and uj(l)(al+1;￿) > uj(l)(al;￿):
Further, l(￿;￿;a) is uniformly bounded by some ￿ l < 1.
Assuming Condition C holds, let Q(F) be a class of subsets Q of A. A typical Q is de￿ned as
follows:
For each pair of pro￿les ￿ and ￿ in ￿, and for each a 2 F(￿)nF(￿), select one
sequence ￿(￿;￿;a) satisfying (1) and (2) in Condition C. Then let Q be the union of
the elements in these sequences.
Q(F) comprises the Q￿ s constructed from all possible selections.
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C and the following condition as well: there exists a particular Q+ 2 Q(F), and a particular set
B ￿ A containing Q+, such that the following is true for each ￿ 2 ￿:
￿ Each player i has nonempty maximal set B￿
i (￿) ￿ B under ￿, i.e., B￿
i (￿) = argmaxa2B ui(a;￿).
￿ B￿
i (￿) \ B￿
j(￿) = ; for each ￿ 2 ￿ and each i;j 2 N with i 6= j
￿ B￿
i (￿) \ Q+ = ; for each i and each ￿.
Let the selected sequences ￿(￿;￿;a) 2 Q+ be labelled ￿+(￿;￿;a). De￿ne the Moore-Repullo
canonical mechanism ￿MR = (M;g) as follows.
Stage 0: each player i announces some triplet mi;0 = (￿i;ai;ni
0), where ￿i 2 ￿;ai 2 F(￿i), and ni
0
is a nonnegative integer. There are three possibilities to consider:
1. all n players agree on a common pro￿le ￿ and outcome a 2 F(￿), then outcome a is chosen.
STOP
2. If only n￿1 players agree on a common pro￿le ￿ and outcome a 2 F(￿), and if the remaining
player i announces a pro￿le ￿, and
(a) if a 2 F(￿), then outcome a is implemented; STOP
(b) if a = 2 F(￿) but i is not the agent j(0) prescribed in ￿+(￿;￿;a), then outcome a is
implemented; STOP
(c) if a = 2 F(￿) and i = j(0), then go to Stage 1.
3. If neither (1) nor (2) apply, then the player with the highest integer ni
0 is allowed to choose an
outcome from B. Ties are broken by selecting from the players who announced the highest
number according to who has the smallest i. STOP
Stage k = 1;:::;l: each player i can either raise a ￿￿ ag,￿or announce a nonnegative integer
ni
k 2 N, i.e., mi;k 2 Mi;k 2 f￿ agg [ N. Again there are three possibilities to consider:
1. If n ￿ 1 or more ￿ ags are raised, then the agent j(k ￿ 1) prescribed in ￿+(￿;￿;a) is allowed
to choose an outcome from B. STOP
2. If n ￿ 1 or more players announce zero, and
(a) if the player j(k) prescribed in ￿+(￿;￿;a) is one of those who announce zero, then
implement outcome ak from sequence ￿+(￿;￿;a); STOP
(b) if j(k) does not announce zero, then
i. if k < l, go to Stage k + 1;
50ii. if k = l, implement outcome al+1 from sequence ￿+(￿;￿;a). STOP
(c) If neither (1) nor (2) apply, then the player who announces the highest integer ni
k is
allowed to choose an outcome from B. STOP
Theorem 5 (Moore and Repullo (1988)). If a social choice correspondence F satis￿es Condition
C+, and n ￿ 3, then F can be implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Moore and Repullo (1988) show the above theorem by using the mechanism described above.
We note that this mechanism satis￿es A3 if the set of outcomes A is ￿nite or when each player￿ s
preferences over A are strict and utilities are bounded. Furthermore, the above mechanism satis￿es
A3 whenever (i) the set B given in Condition C+ is a compact set of outcomes; (ii) ui : A￿￿ ! R
is continuous in a.41;42 It is worth noting that many researchers assume (i) and (ii) after appealing
to Moore and Repullo￿ s (1988) result. This is the case for instance in Moore and Repullo (1988)￿ s
examples of risk-sharing (Section 6.1) or the production contract example (Section 6.2). More im-
portantly, it is also the case in Maskin and Tirole (1999a)￿ s proof of the irrelevance Theorem. Hence
our non-robusntess result (Theorem 4) also apply to Maskin and Tirole￿ s irrelevance Theorem.
7.4 Su¢ ciency for Robust Implementation: The Case of Social Choice Corre-
spondences (SCCs)
In Remark 3 of Section 4, we argue that Maskin monotonic social choice functions are robustly
implementable. Here we extend this argument to the case of social choice correspondences.
We need to strengthen Maskin monotonicity to the following:
De￿nition 5. An SCC F satis￿es strong Maskin Monotonicity if for every SCF f selected
from F and every pair of states ￿0 and ￿00 such that
f(i;b)
￿ ￿ui(f(￿0);￿0) > ui(b;￿0)g ￿ f(i;b)
￿ ￿ui(f(￿0);￿00) ￿ ui(b;￿00)g
then f(￿0) 2 F(￿00).
Strong Maskin monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity in many economic environ-
ments.43 For example, consider environments in which there is a private good that is both desirable
and continuously transferable. Another example is an environment in which agents have strict pref-
erences. The next de￿nition is the no-veto-power condition, which is widely used in the literature.
41Then, for any ￿ 2 ￿(￿), argmaxa2B
P
~ ￿ ￿(~ ￿)ui(a;~ ￿) 6= ;. We note that a one-shot deviation of player i at stage
k in ￿
MR allows player i possibly to fall into an integer game at stage k where he can get any outcome in B; if he
cannot fall into this integer game, he can only induce a ￿nite number of outcomes, say Bk, by deviating. In any
case, he has a most preferred deviation, i.e., argmaxa2B
P
~ ￿ ￿(~ ￿)ui(a;~ ￿) 6= ;, argmaxa2B[Bk
P
~ ￿ ￿(~ ￿)ui(a;~ ￿) 6= ;,
and argmaxa2Bk
P
~ ￿ ￿(~ ￿)ui(a;~ ￿) 6= ;. Then A3 is satis￿ed whenever (i) and (ii) hold.
42Note that A2 need not be satis￿ed for these mechanisms since B need not be countable. A2 was introduced only
to de￿ne sequential equilibrium in a simple manner. If one uses perfect Bayesian equilibrium instead, we believe
that A2 is not required.
43What we mean by ￿strong￿ is that we replace the ￿rst weak inequality of (￿) in the de￿nition of Maskin monotonic-
ity with a strict one. This notion also appears in Chung and Ely (2003).
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that for at least n ￿ 1 players i, ui(c;￿) ￿ ui(b;￿) for every b 2 A, we have c 2 F(￿).
We need one extra condition together with strong Maskin monotonicity and no-veto power.
This is the no-worst-alternative condition as de￿ned by Cabrales and Serrano (2011):
De￿nition 7. An SCC F satis￿es the no-worst-alternative (NWA) condition if for each agent
i 2 N, ￿ 2 ￿ and f selected from F, there exists z(i;￿;f) 2 A such that ui(f(￿);￿) > ui(z(i;￿;f);￿).
Let P denote the set of priors over ￿ ￿ S with the following metric d : P ￿ P ! R+: for any
￿;￿
0
2 P,
d(￿;￿
0
) = max
(￿;s)2￿￿S
j￿(￿;s) ￿ ￿
0
(￿;s)j:
So, when we say ￿k ! ￿, we mean that d(￿k;￿) ! 0 as k ! 1. When ￿￿S is a ￿nite state space,
Theorem 14.5 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a) shows that when ￿k ! ￿ as k ! 1, there exists
fpkg1
k=1 such that (1) pk ! 1 as k ! 1; (2) ￿k(f(￿;s￿)g￿2￿) ￿ pk for each k; and (3) for each k,
it is common pk-belief at any pro￿le of signals s￿ that ￿ has realized.44
We propose the following de￿nition of robust implementation:
De￿nition 8. An SCC F is robustly implementable under the complete information prior ￿ if
there exists a mechanism ￿ = (M;g) satisfying the following two properties: for any SCF f selected
from F and any sequence of priors f￿"g">0 converging to ￿, (1) there is a sequence of sequential
equilibria f￿"g">0 in f￿(￿")g">0 satisfying lim"!0 g(￿"(s￿);;) = f(￿) for every ￿ 2 ￿; and (2) for
any sequence of sequential equilibria f￿"g">0 in f￿(￿")g">0, we have lim"!0 g(￿"(s￿);;) 2 F(￿) for
every ￿ 2 ￿.
Remark 4.: The ￿rst requirement of robust implementation says that for any SCF f selected from
a given SCC F and any environment near ￿, there is an equilibrium whose outcome is close to that
given by f whenever a signal pro￿le s has strictly positive probability under ￿ (i.e., s = s￿ for some
￿). The second requirement says that for any environment near ￿, whenever a signal pro￿le s has
strictly positive probability under ￿, equilibrium outcomes are close to that of F. Both requirements
are robust analogs of the two standard requirements of implementation.45 Roughly speaking, the
￿rst requirement embodies a version of lower hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence and
the second embodies a version of upper hemi-continuity.46 As is clear from the proof of Theorem
3, to show that Maskin monotonicity is necessary for SCCs to be robustly implemented, we only
used the second property of robust implementation and do not exploit the full strength of robust
implementation. Finally, the subsequent argument provides su¢ cient conditions under which a
44See Monderer and Samet (1989) and/or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a) for the precise de￿nition of common
p-belief.
45See, for instance, Maskin (1999) for the de￿nition of Nash implementation.
46Property (2) in our de￿nition says that the correspondence from priors to equilibrium outcomes has a closed graph.
In general, this is not equivalent to upper hemi-continuity. However, the closed graph property of the equilibrium
outcomes correspondence implies upper hemi-continuity if the range of the correspondence is compact (see Aliprantis
and Border (1999)).
52static mechanism yields robust implementation. Hence, the result would hold if we were to replace
sequential equilibrium by Nash equilibrium in the above statement.
We are now ready to state the result:
Theorem 6. Suppose there are at least three players, i.e., jNj = n ￿ 3. If an SCC F satis￿es strong
Maskin monotonicity, no-veto-power and the NWA condition, then F is robustly implementable.
Proof. We construct an implementing mechanism ￿ = (M;g).47 For each i 2 N, let Mi = (￿￿F)[
(Z+ ￿A) where Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers. That is, each agent is asked to report either
a state and a social choice function or an integer and an alternative. Let m￿;f denote the message
pro￿le ((￿;f);(￿;f);:::;(￿;f)), and m￿;fnmi the pro￿le obtained from m￿;f by substituting mi for
agent i. We set g(m￿;f) = f(￿). If mi = (￿0;f0), and if there exists an alternative c 2 A such that
ui(c;￿
0
) > ui(f(￿);￿
0
) but ui(f(￿);￿) > ui(c;￿), then we set g(m￿;fnmi) = c. (If there is more than
one such c, select one arbitrarily). For all other cases, we set g(m￿;fnmi) = z(i;￿;f(￿)) as de￿ned
for the NWA condition.
Consider any other pro￿le of messages m. If each mi consists of a state and a social choice
function, then choose g(m) to be an arbitrary element of F(￿). If at least one agent has announced
an integer and an alternative, set g(m) to be the alternative named by the agent whose named
integer is the greatest (breaking ties by choosing the lowest index among those who announced the
greatest integer).
The rest of the proof can be completed by the following three steps: in Step 1, we show that for
any SCF f selected from F, there exists a good equilibrium whose outcome coincides with that of
f for any nearby environment. In Step 2, we show that any Nash equilibrium outcome is socially
desirable. In Step 3, we show that this continues to be the case in nearby environments.
For any complete information prior ￿, let U(￿) denote a neighborhood around ￿ with respect
to metric d.
Step 1: Let ￿ be a complete information prior. For each SCF f selected from F, there exists a
neighborhood U(￿) for which there exists a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium ￿ of the game ￿(￿)
for each ￿ 2 U(￿) such that g(￿(s￿)) = f(￿) for every ￿ 2 ￿.
For each SCF f selected from F and ￿ 2 ￿, consider the truthful strategy of agent i as
m
￿;f
i = (￿;f). This yields g(m￿;f) = f(￿). By construction, if in state ￿, agent i sends message
mi 6= m
￿;f
i ,
ui(g(m￿;f);￿) > ui(g(m￿;fnmi);￿):
Hence, m￿;f is a strict Nash equilibrium of the game ￿(￿). De￿ne ￿i(s￿
i) = (￿;f) for each s￿
i 2 Si as
agent i￿ s strategy of the game ￿(￿). Then ￿ is a strict Nash equilibrium of the game ￿(￿). De￿ne
A[￿￿i] =
n
a 2 A
￿
￿ ￿ 9s￿i 2 S￿i; 9￿
0
i such that g(￿
0
i(si);￿￿i(s￿i)) = a
o
as the set of possible outcomes that can be induced by agent i￿ s strategy ￿
0
i against ￿￿i. By
47The proof here is a modi￿cation of that of Theorem 2 of Chung and Ely (2003).
53construction of ￿ and the ￿niteness of S, A[￿￿i] is ￿nite. It is important to note that each agent
can only induce a ￿nite number of outcomes, while the set of strategies may be in￿nite. By the
continuity of expected utility and the ￿niteness of S, N, and A[￿￿i], there is a neighborhood U(￿)
such that ￿ continues to be a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game ￿(￿) for every ￿ 2 U(￿).
Step 2: Let ￿ be a complete information prior and ￿ be a Nash equilibrium of the game ￿(￿).
Then, g(￿(s￿)) 2 F(￿) for every ￿ 2 ￿.
Suppose ￿ is a Nash equilibrium of ￿(￿). Assume further that in ￿(s￿), each player announces
the same state and SCF (￿
0
;f
0
). Then, g(￿(s￿)) = f
0
(￿
0
). In this case, we claim that f
0
(￿
0
) 2 F(￿).
If this is not the case, by strong Maskin monotonicity, there exist a player i and an alternative a
such that ui(a;￿) > ui(f
0
(￿
0
);￿) but ui(f
0
(￿
0
);￿
0
) > ui(a;￿
0
). By construction of ￿, we can conclude
that g(￿(s￿)n(￿;f0)) = a. Thus, ￿(s￿) would not be a Nash equilibrium of ￿(￿). For any other
pro￿le ￿(s￿), there must be at least n ￿ 1 agents who can deviate from ￿(￿) and bring about a
pro￿le in which there are at least 3 distinct messages. Thus, by construction of ￿, each of these
agents could dictatorially choose his most preferred alternative from A in state ￿. But since ￿(s￿)
is a Nash equilibrium of ￿(￿), it must be that for each of these players i, ui(g(￿(s￿));￿) ￿ ui(a;￿)
for every a 2 A. Since F satis￿es no-veto-power, g(￿(s￿)) 2 F(￿).
Step 3: Let ￿ be be a complete information. Suppose that ￿ is a strategy pro￿le such that
g(￿(s￿)) = 2 F(￿) for some ￿ 2 ￿. It is enough for our purpose to show that there must exist a
neighborhood U(￿) such that ￿ is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game ￿(￿) for every
￿ 2 U(￿).
Suppose ￿ is given such that g(￿(s￿)) = 2 F(￿) for some ￿ 2 ￿. This implies that ￿ is not a Nash
equilibrium of ￿(￿). Hence, there exists an agent i and a strategy ￿
0
i such that
ui(g((￿
0
i;￿￿i)(s￿));￿) > ui(g(￿(s￿));￿):
By the continuity of expected utility and the ￿niteness of N;S, and A[￿￿i], there exists a neigh-
borhood U(￿) such that for any ￿ 2 U(￿),
X
~ ￿2￿
X
s￿i2S￿i
￿(~ ￿;s￿ijs￿
i)
h
ui(g(￿
0
i(s￿
i);￿￿i(s￿i));~ ￿) ￿ ui(g(￿i(s￿
i);￿￿i(s￿i));~ ￿)
i
> 0:
This implies that ￿ is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of ￿(￿) for every ￿ 2 U(￿).
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